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The outbreak of the Arab Spring and the subsequent overthrow of Mubarak in 2011 gave 
way to the rise of Islamists to power. The Muslim Brotherhood’s regime was perceived 
by the Coptic community, in particular, as a real threat to Copts’ collective identities. In 
response, ordinary Christians started to organize around religion as well as the religious 
group to which they belong in order to manage perceived as well as real fears and 
uncertainties prevailing at the time. This has eventually incited new patterns of 
communal political activism among Christians, who seemingly embarked on “street 
politics” rather than “electoral politics” in resisting the incumbent, which was noticeably 
seen in the massive protests of June 30
th
, 2013.  
This thesis is an engagement with the underlying causes and mechanisms that were 
motivating collective action of Copts during the Brotherhood’s rule.  Broadly, it seeks to 
establish a linkage between religion and politics. Utilizing a social identity theory and a 
mixed-method consisting of both qualitative and quantitative indicators, I argue that 
communal behavior of Copts was basically shaped by growing religious fears shared by 
Coptic constituencies at the time while the Islamists were in office. Dynamics which were 
transforming religious worries into real action are further discussed. The current thesis 
contributes to literature on transition through its emphasis on the causes and mechanisms 
that construct and reconstruct identities of “subaltern” religious minorities (i.e., Egypt’s 
Copts) during times of sociopolitical transformation.      
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 Notes on Transliteration 
I have utilized the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES) system of 
transliteration in transliterating Arabic words into English, as the following table 
illustrates. However, well-known cities, personal names, and incidents (e.g., Aswan, 
Mubarak, and Maspero) were written as they are always used in the English form.  
Consonant Vowels 
أ ’ ط ṭ Long  ا Ā 
 ب B ظ ẓ Long  و Ū 
ت T ع ‘ Long  ي Ī 
ث Th غ Gh Doubled   ّي iyy 
ج J ف F Doubled   ّو uww 
ح ḥ ق Q Diphthongs  ّو au or aw 
خ Kh ك K Diphthongs ّ ّى  ai or ay 
د D ل L Short ـَ a 
ذ Dh م M Short ـُ u 
ر R ن N Short ـِ i 
ز Z ـه H   
س S و W   
ش Sh ي Y   
ص ṣ ة A   
ض ḍ     
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On 6 March 1911, the Coptic laity held the so-called ‘Coptic Congress’ in Asyut 
(Southern Egypt) whose main goal was to shed light on the complaints and demands of 
the Christian community at the time. The organizers ended up with a list of grievances 
which included the following. 1) Religious discrimination against Copts since they were 
not given a day off in Sunday whereas Friday was a day of rest for Muslims. 2) The bias 
against Christians in employment, particularly in high-rank positions. 3) The 
underrepresentation of Copts in provincial councils. 4) The inequity in distributing 
educational privileges among Muslims and Copts. This was manifested in prohibiting 
Coptic children from studying in the Kuttābs (elementary religious schools) and public 
schools, whereas Muslim children were allowed. This was based on the premises that 
these places were deemed Islamic establishments.
1
  
Ironically, Coptic grievances have not entirely been resolved yet despite the fact 
that more than hundred years have passed since the Coptic Congress (see chapter 2). 
What is worse, the position of Copts has deteriorated due to several waves of sectarian 
violence they have encountered since the 1970s onwards, which culminated after the 
Arab Spring. In fact, the rise of Islamists to power in the wake of the 2011 uprisings has 
enhanced fears and worries among Copts. Furthermore, several legitimate questions 
concerning the roles and duties of religious minorities ruled by an Islamist government 
were raised. The following are just a few instances. What are consequences associated 
                                                          
1
 Kyriakos Mikhail, Copts and Moslems under British Control (London: Smith 
Elder & Co, 1911), 28-30; Ṭāriq al-Bishrī, Al-Muslimūn wa al-’Aqbāṭ fī Iṭār al-Jamā‘a 
al-Waṭaniyya (Cairo: al-Hay’a al-‘Amma lil Kitāb,1980), 81-82.   
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with the application of the sharī‘a state, which has been advocated by the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) even before assuming office, on Copts? Would Copts be granted 
equal political rights as those of Muslims? Socially speaking, would Christians be 
considered ahl-dhimma (i.e., protected religious minority) as mainstream Islamist 
tradition has confirmed (see chapter 2)? How would Copts proceed, socially as well as 
politically, within such a religiously-hostile public sphere? Would Copts revolve around 
Church and religious identity acting as “Christians”, or would they organize around the 
wider national identity behaving as “Egyptians”? What are implications of the religio-
political polarization which dominated Egypt back then on the prospects of democracy in 
the post-2011 era?     
The current thesis intends to address these questions by examining first Islamists’ 
conceptualizations of state and role of the sharī‘a in the modern state. Then it 
investigates Coptic fears and concerns stemming from the ascendance of Islamists to 
power, emphasizing the association between these fears and subsequent collective actions 
seen later in the June 30
th
 mass protests. Relatedly, this work explores the underlying 
factors constructing communal actions of Copts during the MB’s reign in particular, 
focusing on the potential roles played by religious collective identification and growing 
religious threats.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
This thesis tries to answer the following two main research questions:  
RQ 1: What are the underlying causes that shaped Copts’ collective action in the political 
realm during the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule (2012-2013)? 
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Taking other sociopolitical factors into consideration, this study argues that Copts’ 
political communal actions were primarily constructed due to growing feelings of 
religious threats perceived at the time. In other words, it argues that Christians’ religious 
identity became more salient under the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamist rule.    
RQ 2: What are the mechanisms that transformed perceived religious threats into actual 
collective action?  
This work contends that perceived religious threats were transformed into actual 
collective action through mechanisms occurring at both individual and communal levels. 
While the former included perceptions of unequal citizenship and personal insecurity, the 
latter involved processes of group identification and group consciousness.  
Taken together, this thesis suggests a casual mechanisms model (see chapter 4) 
that helps explain the proposed association between perceived religious threats (i.e., the 
independent variable) and the collective action of Copts (i.e. the dependent variable), 
highlighting certain mechanisms that were transforming these perceived threats into real 
action. More specifically, perceived religious threats that dominated the Coptic 
community during MB rule generated growing feelings of personal insecurity and 
unequal citizenship among individual Copts. These individual-level mechanisms were 
transformed at the communal level yielding increasing incidents of group identification 
and group consciousness, which eventually incited Copts’ collective action seen in the 
June 30 revolt. In essence, Christian collective action aimed at eliminating the main 
source motivating the perceived threats in the first place, namely the Brotherhood’s 
Islamist regime. 
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Literature Review 
Transitions have figured prominently in contemporary politics. Considerable intellectual 
capital has been devoted thus far to addressing the causes, processes, and consequences 
associated with times of political transformation, utilizing diverse theoretical and 
methodological approaches. A robust theory explaining when and why exactly political 
changes occur has not been generated yet. Nevertheless, scholars have agreed that all 
societies undergoing transitions experience a “condition of uncertainty” while departing 
from authoritarianism towards political democracy.
2
  
According to O’Donnell and Schmitter, transition can be described as a 
movement from “certain authoritarian regimes toward an uncertain something else.”3 
Much scholarly attention has been devoted to exploring the roles played either by    
agents
4
 and/or structures
5
 in shaping mechanisms and outcomes of transitions. Agreeing 
                                                          
2
 See for example, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); 
Valerie Bunce, “Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations,” 
Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 6/7 (2000): 703-734; Todd Eisenstadt, “Eddies in 
the Third Wave: Protracted Transitions and Theories of Democratization,” 
Democratization 7, no. 3 (2000): 3-24; Stephen  King, The New Authoritarianism in the 
Middle East and North Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009);  Alfred 
Stepan and Juan Linz, “Democratization Theory and the ‘Arab Spring’,” Journal of 
Democracy 24, no. 2 (2013): 15-30. 
 
3
 O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, 3. 
 
4
 See for instance, Barbara Geddes, “What do we Know about Democratization 
after Twenty Years?” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 115-144; Bunce, 
2000; O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions. 
 
5
 Seymour Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 
(1959): 69–105; Seymour Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 
Presidential Address,” American Sociological Review 59, no.1 (1994): 1-22; Jason 
 
5 
 
with Charles Tilly, the structure-agency dichotomy should be abandoned while 
approaching the complexities associated with political transformations, leaving space for 
analyzing the dynamic interactions occurring among competing groups within a given 
society in transition.
6
  
Reviewing the literature on transition reveals that while the influence of elite 
factions has been given much attention, less is known about “ordinary” citizens and how 
they handle the growing fears accompanied with times of political change. More 
importantly, the social and political behavior of religious minorities has received scant 
attention. Furthermore, whereas much emphasis has been placed on sociopolitical 
contexts as being key factors determining outcomes of political transformation, 
religiously-driven variables have frequently been overlooked in existing literature on 
transition and social mobilization.
7
 The current thesis is dedicated to filling this gap by 
analyzing collective action taken by ordinary Coptic citizens (i.e., non-elite and non-
activists) during the Brotherhood’s transition, investigating potential influences of 
religiously-motivated factors driving these actions.   
Understanding Christians’ sociopolitical behavior during the Brotherhood’s 
transition is incomplete unless the broader Muslim-Coptic relationship is explored. To 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Brownlee, Tarek Masoud and Andrew Reynolds, The Arab Spring: Pathways of 
Repression and Reform (UK: Oxford University Press, 2015).  
 
6
 Charles Tilly, “Processes and Mechanisms of Democratization,” Sociological 
Theory 18, no. 2 (2001): 18. 
 
7
 See for example, Michael Hoffman and Amaney Jamal, “Religion in the Arab 
Spring: Between Two Competing Narratives,” The Journal of Politics 76, no. 3 (2014): 
593-606; Ceren Belge and Ekrem Karakoç, “Minorities in the Middle East: Ethnicity, 
Religion, and Support for Authoritarianism,” Political Research Quarterly 86, no. 2 
(2015): 280-292. 
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begin with, Christian-Muslim relations are a multifaceted and complex issue as the 
literature has clearly shown. On the one hand, it can be addressed utilizing different 
levels of analysis: the state-church level; the societal level reflected in the daily 
interactions between Coptic and Muslim communities; the international level through 
which Coptic diaspora and international human organizations along with global powers 
intervene in local affairs for political ends. On the other hand, a wide array of historical, 
socio-political, economic, religious and cultural factors has together led to the 
construction of Christian-Muslim relationships over centuries.  
Broadly, it can be argued that the relation between the Coptic minority, the largest 
Christian minority community in the Middle East, and the Muslim majority in Egypt has 
gone through different ebbs and flows over the past century. For instance, the 1919 
revolution signified an unprecedented moment of national unity, when both Muslims and 
Copts fought shoulder-to-shoulder against British rule which eventually led to Egypt’s 
independence. This harmony was seen once again in the drafting process of the 1923 
constitution. For instance, the Committee of Thirty that had been formed to write Egypt’s 
first constitution included 6 members representing non-Muslim minorities (twenty per 
cent of the committee).
8
 Furthermore, despite the negative implications associated with 
Article 194 of the constitution on the identity of Copts, which states that “Islam is the 
religion of the state and Arabic is its official language”, this Article was approved 
                                                          
8
 Ṭāriq al-Bishrī, Al-Muslimūn wa al-’Aqbāṭ, 174; Samīr Murquṣ, “al-’Aqbāṭ wa 
al-Sharī‘a bayn Dustūr “al-Haraka al-Waṭaniyya” (1923) wa Dustūr “waly al-’Amr” 
(1971),” in Al-Mūwāṭana fī Mūwajahat al-Ṭa’ifiyya, ed. Amr al-Shūbakī (Cairo: Markaz 
al-Ahrām lil Drāsāt al-Siyāsiyya wa al-Istrātījiyya, 2009), 81.  
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unanimously by the committee.
9
 Contrary to what had been known as the “golden age” 
for Copts, extending throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the status of the Coptic laity was 
weakened in the aftermath of the 1952 revolution due to the socioeconomic policies 
adopted by Nasser. These policies, however, enhanced the church’s power since it 
became the Copts’ sole representative before the state in return for Pope Kyrollos’ 
unlimited support to Nasser.
10
   
The informal Nasser-Kyrollos “entente” was undermined under Sadat’s reign, 
during which political Islam was dominating Egypt’s public sphere. According to Saba 
Mahmood, “if Nasser’s policies are held responsible for the confessionalization of Coptic 
identity, then Anwar Sadat’s regime (1970-1981) is regarded as having opened the door 
for the polarization of Muslim identity along confessional lines.”11 Muslim-Coptic 
interactions during Sadat were negatively shaped by several variables, such as the 
ostensible tensions between Sadat and Pope Shenuda III, the escalation of Islamism, and 
the religiously-inspired violent incidents targeting Copts and their assets.
12
  
As for Mubarak’s era (1981-2011), the church’s social and political power was 
further consolidated and incidents of sectarian violence targeting assets and places of 
                                                          
9
 Fahmī Huwyadī, “Al-Mādda al-Thāniya men al-Dustūr wa Qaḍiyat al-
Muwāṭana,” in Al-Muwāṭana fī Muwajahat al-Ṭa’ifiyya, 26.   
 
10
 Mariz Tadros, “Vicissitudes in the Entente between the Coptic Orthodox 
Church and the State in Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 41, no. 2 
(2009): 272. 
 
11
 Saba Mahmood, “Religious Freedom, the Minority Question, and Geopolitics 
in the Middle East,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 54, no. 20 (2012): 436. 
 
12
 Tadros, “Vicissitudes,” 273. 
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worship of Copts continued.
13
 The ascendance of Islamists to power following Mubarak’s 
overthrow in 2011 has ushered in a new and fiercer wave of sectarian assaults against 
Copts and their assets, however. For example, Jason Brownlee contends that under 
president Mursī the “anti-Christian violence brought chilling validation to the concerns 
Copts harbored. Kidnappings in Upper Egypt continued, and anti-Christian attacks 
rocked the heart of the country as well.”14 In fact, these attacks have greatly escalated 
after the ousting of Islamists in 2013. On 21 August 2013, a week after the clearing of the 
Raba‘a and al-Nahda sit-ins, Human Rights Watch released a report entitled “Egypt: 
Mass attacks on Churches”. The report states that:  
Immediately following the violent dispersal of the Brotherhood’s sit-ins in Cairo 
on August 14, crowds of men attacked at least 42 churches, burning or damaging 
37, as well as dozens of other Christian religious institutions in the governorates 
of Minya, Asyut, Fayum, Giza, Suez, Sohag, Bani Suef, and North Sinai.
15
  
As was shown above, Copts have encountered several phases of tolerance and 
persecution alike across different times and regimes. The challenging question posed 
now, however, is why does Copts’ identity become more salient as noticed under the 
                                                          
13
 Paul Sedra, “Class Cleavages and Ethnic Conflict: Coptic Christian 
Communities in Modern Egyptian Politics,” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relation 10, 
no. 2 (1999): 219-253; Mariz Tadros, “Copts under Mursi: Defiance in the Face of 
Denial,” Middle East Report 267, (2013): 22-27. 
 
14
 Jason Brownlee, “Violence against Copts in Egypt,” Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, www.carnegieendowment.org/2013/11/14/violence-against-copts-
in-egypt-pub-53606. 
 
15
 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Mass Attacks on Churches,” 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/21/egypt-mass-attacks-churches.  
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Brotherhood’s rule yielding such communal religious fears and insecurity (as will be 
elaborated later)? The literature on collective mobilization has traditionally focused on 
economic and political grievances as key factors determining why and when citizens 
mobilize.
16
 Nevertheless, a growing body of scholarship has recently called for shifting 
attention away from sociopolitical variables towards cultural and psychological ones 
while addressing causes triggering collective behavior. Within this tradition, some 
commentators have focused on religion as one of the main catalyst motivating political 
participation.
17
 Other analysts have highlighted the roles played by social identification 
and group categorization processes.
18
 
                                                          
16
 See for example, Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1970); Robert Dhal, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (Yale: Yale 
University Press, 1971); Ricca Edmondson, ed., The Political Context of Collective 
Action: Power, Argumentation and Democracy (London: Routledge, 1997); Louise Tilly 
and Charles Tilly, ed., Class Conflict and Collective Action (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1981); Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, The Arab Spring, Pathways of 
Repression and Reform (UK: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
 
17
 See for example, Dennis Patterson, Gamal Gasim, and Jangsup Choi, “Identity, 
Issue, and Religious Commitment and Participation: Explaining Turnout among Mosque-
Attending Muslim Americans,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 11, no.3 (2011): 
343-357;  Kenneth Wald, Dennis Owen and Samuel Hill, “Churches as Political 
Communities,” American Political Science Review 82, no. 2 (1988): 531-548;   Fredrick  
Harris, “Something within: Religion as a Mobilizer of African-American Political 
Activism,” The Journal of Politics 56, no. 1 (1994): 42-68; Calhoun  Brown, “African 
American Churches and Political Mobilization: The Psychological Impact of 
Organizational Resources,” The Journal of Politics 58, no. 4 (1996): 935-953; Fiona  
McCallum, “Christian Political Participation in the Arab World,” Islam and Christian 
Muslim Relations 23, no. 1 (2012): 3-18; Saba Mahmood, “Religious Freedom, the 
Minority Question, and Geopolitics in the Middle East,” Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 54, no. 20 (2012): 418-446; Eva Pföstl and Will Kymlicka, “Minority 
Politics in the Middle East and North Africa: The Prospects for Transformative Change,” 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 14, no. 38 (2015): 2489-2498.  
 
18
 See for instance, Steven Greene, “Social Identity Theory and Party 
Identification,” Social Science Quarterly 85, no. 1 (2004): 136-153: Beth Uhler, “The 
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The current study belongs to the latter school of thought in that it explores the 
relationship between perceived religious identity threats and Copts’ political behavior. 
Despite the fact that “religious affiliation became the Copts’ main marker, not their 
citizenship” since Nasser’s era as Mariz Tadros has indicated,19 Copts have never been 
exposed to such real threats as they were under the Islamist’s rule (see chapter 2). In fact, 
it was the first time in Copts’ modern history to be ruled by an Islamist actor, i.e. the 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
According to Jason Brownlee, the Coptic minority perceived Muslim Brotherhood 
rule as aiming at transforming the national narrative from “Egyptianness” to an “Islamic” 
identity.
20
 Agreeing, Andrea Rugh indicates that “[d]uring the year of President Morsy’s 
tenure, Christians saw their position eroding as he moved quickly to institute measures 
more in line with the establishment of an Islamic state.”21 Moreover, Christian 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Escalation of Commitment in Political Decision-Making Groups: A Social Identity 
Approach,” European Journal of Social Psychology 26 (1996): 611-629; Oral Muldoon, 
Karen Trew, Jennifer Todd, Nathalie Rougier and Katrina McLaughlin, “Religious and 
National Identity after the Belfast Good Friday Agreement,” Political Psychology 28, 
no.1 (2007): 89-103; Stephan Stürmer and Bernd Simon, “The Role of Collective 
Identification in Social Movement Participation: A Panel Study in the Context of the 
German Gay Movement,” Personality and Social Psychology 30, no.3 (2004): 263-277; 
Caroline Kelly and Sara Breinlinger, The Social Psychology of Collective Action: 
Identity, Injustice, and Gender (London: Taylor& Francis, 1996).    
 
19
 Tadros, “Vicissitudes,” 271. 
 
20
  Brownlee, “Violence against Copt,” 5. 
 
21
  Andrea Rugh, Christians in Egypt: Strategies and Survival (UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2016), 191. 
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communities have developed a common sense of social isolation during the rise of 
Islamists, which can be attributed to the growing feelings of lack of citizenship.
22
 
In sum, it can be contended that any analysis seeking to understand political 
actions adopted by Copts during the MB’s rule is incomplete unless the cultural as well 
as psychological variables which helped construct these actions are taken into 
consideration. Therefore, the current work finds itself located at the intersection of three 
main traditions. The first is politics, where Copts’ political behaviors are analyzed. The 
second field relates to social phycology, in which the influences of social identity-related 
threats in addition to social categorization processes on shaping social action are 
explored. The final discipline revolves around religion, where prolonged religious 
cleavages existing between the Coptic minority and the Muslim majority, furthered 
during Mursī’s transition, are addressed. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Social Identity Theory  
Understanding a multifaceted issue such as the one at hand, namely Copts’ sociopolitical 
responses to the rise of Islamists, requires a broader gaze outside politics analyzing the 
psychological, cultural, and religious context. This is due to the fact that the sociopolitical 
behavior adopted by religious minorities (i.e., Egypt’s Christians) in times of political 
transformation cannot be explained based solely on political factors.  Growing communal 
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fears and uncertainties featuring in periods of political change are, hence, expected to 
play pivotal roles in shaping behavior. That is to say, socio-psychological variables such 
as identity salience, collective identification, and self-esteem are deemed equally 
important as other relevant political variables while approaching the positioning of 
religious minorities in times of social unrest. Based on this reasoning, the current study 
employs the social identity approach, which is considered the most relevant theoretical 
framework allowing for a deeper understanding of the research puzzle under scrutiny. 
Broadly, social identity theory is a social psychological tradition explaining 
mutual relations between individual persons and social groups in a given society. It 
contends that the way in which one perceives the self and the group to which one belongs 
are significant for the construction of social actions and attitudes.
23
 The theory was 
formulated by Henri Tajfel in the 1970s, and has received considerable scholarly 
attention since then. According to Tajfel, social identity is defined as “that part [Italic in 
original] of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his 
membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional 
significance attached to that membership.”24 Clearly, this conceptualization emphasizes 
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the crucial roles played by social groups (e.g., religion, gender, party, and ethnicity) in 
constructing not only cognitive and attitudinal perceptions of individuals, but more 
importantly social identities. That is, group membership becomes an integral part of one’s  
conception of the self and other social groups. As Beth Uhler pointed out, “people gain a 
sense of who they are, and derive much of their self-esteem, from memberships in social 
groups…[and therefore] positive social identity produces strong relations when that 
identity is endangered.”25  
While deconstructing the social-psychological meanings attached to group 
membership, Tajfel has provided three main dimensions. The first is cognitive, which 
refers to an individual’s awareness that he/she belongs to a certain social group. The 
second is evaluative, where positive as well as negative meanings come into one’s mind 
when his/her in-group is compared to other groups (i.e. out-groups). The final aspect is 
emotional, which signifies the extent to which individuals are emotionally committed 
(e.g., like or dislike) to their group based on the cognitive and evaluative aspects 
previously mentioned.
26
  
Accordingly, developing positive or negative social identities is strongly 
associated with diverse degrees of belonging to certain social groups as Hogg and 
Abrams have demonstrated.
27
 These authors have emphasized the psychological and 
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functional roles played by social categories. As for the former, identification with a 
certain social category is deemed “phenomenologically real and has important self-
evaluative consequences.”28  With regard to the latter, social groups “fulfil individual and 
societal needs for order, structure, simplification, predictability according to the 
authors.”29  
Bearing these psychological and functional aspects in mind, the social identity 
perspective is deemed a sociological tradition as well since it primarily addresses 
reciprocal interactions among social groups on one side, and explores dialectical relations 
between individuals and society on the other. In other words, it explores how personal 
identities are being connected with social identities. Taking these main principles 
together, the social identity framework contributes substantially to the understanding of 
mutual interactions occurring within groups (intra-group level) and between groups 
(inter-group level). More importantly, it assists in predicting patterns of reactions that 
might be adopted by disadvantaged or threatened social categories particularly during 
times of social transformations.     
Specifically, one of the theory’s core assumptions is organized around the idea 
that individuals are in crucial need to have and maintain a positive social identity. Henri 
Tajfel and John Turner provided three main social-psychological processes enabling 
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individuals to sustain a satisfactory image either about themselves or their respective 
groups: social categorization, social identity, and social comparison.
30
 
To start with, social categorization is a cognitive mechanism which helps 
individuals to organize and deal with the surrounding social environment on one side, and 
guide them towards more appropriate social actions on the other.
31
 According to Tajfel, 
categorizations are crucial mechanics because they assist individuals to draw social 
distinctions between the “us” and the “them,” or between the in-group and relevant 
opposing out-groups.
32
 As for social identification processes, the theory emphasizes that 
individuals’ self-perception is mainly derived from one’s awareness that his/her group is 
socially valued.
33
 Literature on social identification has frequently highlighted the 
affective as well as behavioral consequences resulting from commitment to a certain 
social group.
34
 With regard to social comparison, theorists of social identity argue that 
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persons tend to conduct continuous social comparisons between the group to which they 
belong and out-groups, making sure that their own group is socially respected.
35
   
Since developing a satisfactory social identity is crucial for constructing a positive 
self-image according to the theory, people belonging to less favorable social groups 
utilize different alternatives by which perceived low self-esteem is addressed. Two main 
mechanisms are provided by the theory in this regard: social mobility and social change. 
To begin with, Social mobility occurs primarily on the individual level, when individual 
persons choose voluntarily to leave perceived disadvantaged groups, moving towards 
more favorable ones in an attempt to improve their social positioning.
36
 When it is 
difficult or impossible for an individual to “pass” freely from one social group to another, 
people utilize the “social change” strategy. This could be seen when people act 
collectively in order to change general conditions of life threatening the position of the 
entire group.
37
      
 
The Relevance of the Social Identity Theory to the Research Puzzle 
Several reasons can be provided elucidating why social identity is deemed the most 
relevant framework to the study’s main question. First, the theory basically addresses 
intergroup relations giving a special attention to minority groups whose social positions 
are disadvantaged and/or insecure. This type of understanding fits neatly with the main 
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focus in this work, which is mainly directed to understanding how the Coptic minority 
responded to perceived threats during the MB’s rule. In other words, it assists in 
explaining social behavior taken by a threatened minority group (i.e., Copts) living 
among a majoritarian community (i.e., Muslims) in times of transition.   
Second, the rationale of this work is to identify mechanisms linking perceptions 
of identity threats (i.e., cognitive aspect) adopted on the individual level with real actions 
(i.e., behavioral dimension) adhered collectively by a certain social group. In fact, the 
social identity perspective helps accomplish this goal, since it primarily highlights 
dialectical relations between the self and the other (i.e., the in-group and out-group)
38
 
occurring through specific processes such as social categorizations and comparisons 
illustrated earlier. In other words, it moves from person to social group (i.e., from 
individual to society) which matches precisely with the current project’s primary goal.  
Third, the theory provides two main mechanisms enabling individuals to deal with 
perceived identity threats (i.e, social mobility and social change). These mechanisms are 
to be exploited in this study in order to track changes in the attitudes and behaviors taken 
by Copts, either on the individual or communal level, across times and regimes (i.e., 
SCAF’s transition versus Mursī’s transition).   
Finally, the literature on democratization and regime change focused on political 
and economic factors, overlooking other social and psychological aspects. Since the main 
goal of this work is to reconsider these ignored yet important factors, it would greatly 
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benefit from the social identity approach which is mainly considered a social 
psychological-based theoretical framework.     
Methodology   
This thesis adopts Lieberman’s Nested Analysis Approach,39 in which a complementary 
strategy of both quantitative and qualitative methods is employed. This strategy helps 
bridge “great holes in the relations between independent and dependent variables” as 
McAdam et al have illustrated.
40
 Furthermore, it assists in an understanding of the 
potential variations that might exist in the participants’ responses. Since the main aim of 
this study is to analyze collective actions taken by Copts under “Islamist” rule (namely, 
Mursī’s regime), it is important to explore whether or not these actions varied under 
different regimes (i.e, SCAF’s transition and Mursī’s period). To trace these variations, 
the study further adopts Lijphart’s “Diachronic Comparative Analysis,”41 which aims at 
“maximizing comparability” of results as the author elaborated. In other words, this 
approach would allow for comparing collective actions taken by the same unit of analysis 
(i.e., Copts) experiencing different types of regime (i.e., the SCAF and the MB), which 
ultimately helps to examine the main argument of study from its two sides.  
Quantitatively, the Arab Barometer dataset (AB) will be utilized to empirically 
examine the study’s main premises. Specifically, while the AB Wave II contains data 
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addressing SCAF’s period (the fieldwork was conducted from 16 to July 3, 2011), the AB 
Wave III provides data covering events during Mursī’s era (the interviews were 
conducted from March 31 to April 7, 2013). The uniqueness of the two waves lies in the 
fact that both include a wide variety of questions relevant to the research puzzle at hand. 
Some of the questions covered, for example, the following topics: diverse levels of trust 
in key political forces at the time, such as the MB, the SCAF, and the cabinet; perceived 
personal security threats; evaluations of equal citizenship status; levels of interest in 
politics; attitudes towards democracy and democratic systems; and attitudes towards the 
implementation of sharī‘a. In fact, these questions allow for conducting several 
comparisons between Copts and Muslims across the two political transitions under 
investigation. 
While the AB material help meet quantitative-related issues under scrutiny, in-
depth interviews are employed as a primary qualitative strategy aimed at identifying 
possible mechanisms through which Copts’ perceived religious threats were translated 
into collective action. Narratives of a selected group representing ordinary Coptic citizens 
are collected and analyzed. It is worth mentioning that the diversity of the interviewees 
was ensured so as to represent diverse socioeconomic backgrounds of Copts (e.g., social 
class, gender, age, education, etc.).  
The dependent variable in this thesis is collective action of Copts (i.e., political 
engagement in protests, marches, sit-ins, meetings discussing political concerns, etc.) 
during the Brotherhood’s regime, whereas the independent variable is perceived religious 
threats experienced by Copts at that time. Influences of other relevant mechanisms (e.g., 
perceptions of unequal citizenship, feelings of personal insecurity, in-group 
20 
 
identification) will also be examined. As for the variables and scales of measurement, 
they will be further elaborated once each one of them is used (see chapters 3 and 4).  
Objectives  
Generally, this thesis mainly addresses the relationship between religion and politics. 
More specifically, its main objective is to understand the extent to which religiously-
driven fears helped construct Copts’ communal political actions during the MB’s reign 
(2012-2013). According to the literature, minorities are extremely concerned with how to 
preserve their religious identity especially in the midst of political transformations.
42
 
Therefore, this study aims to measure perceptions of religious fears adopted by Copts and 
then compare them across two different regimes. In addition, it suggests some plausible 
dynamics through which these perceived fears were transformed into actual behavior. To 
accomplish these goals, the current work relies on a complementary strategy in which 
both quantitative and qualitative methods are utilized. Relatedly, it uses both primary and 
secondary materials. As for the former, narratives provided by a small-N representing 
diverse Coptic backgrounds were gathered and then analyzed qualitatively. With regard 
to the latter, the Arab Barometer (waves II and III) was employed as secondary material 
generating several statistical indicators examining the study’s main arguments 
quantitatively.  
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Adopting such a mixed - methodology consisting of both quantitative and qualitative 
indicators helps handle the shortcomings and limitations of surveys, such as social 
desirability bias. This strategy is crucially important in the current work, where 
respondents belong to a religious minority (i.e., Copts) are asked to participate in public 
opinion surveys during times of uncertainties on both social as well as political levels.   
While existing literature on social mobilization has frequently explored the roles 
played by sociopolitical factors in determining why and when people get involved in 
collective mobilization, this work explores the influences of religion and identity. 
Specifically, it examines connections between religious threats perceived by Copts and 
the likelihood of engagement in politics. To achieve these goals, the social identity 
perspective is employed as the most relevant theoretical framework to the research 
statement under investigation.  
Contribution 
Given the research puzzle at hand, this work is more interested in political decisions 
taken by individual citizens than those adopted by elite factions or the “men with guns” 
during times of transition. While mainstream studies of transition follow the dominant 
“transition without citizens” approach, where the main focus is placed on the elites’ 
political agenda, this study emphasizes what can be described a “transition with citizens” 
model. In fact, the latter mainly focuses on choices of ordinary people in times of 
political unrest. Hence, the significance of this study lies on three levels: 1) the targeted 
unit of analysis (i.e., ordinary Coptic citizens); 2) the timeframe of analysis (i.e., 
collective action of Copts encountering an “Islamist” regime); and 3) the causal 
explanatory factors under investigation (i.e., religious and identity-driven variables). 
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CHAPTER II 
The Rise of the Brothers to Power and its Sociopolitical Implications for Copts 
Setting the Stage: Coptic-Muslim Relations 
Over the last eighty years, the Muslim Brotherhood has been pursuing political power in 
Egypt through a slow and incremental process of Islamizing Egyptian society “from 
below”. Once they assumed power in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the Islamization 
process occurred “from above” as an Islamist President and his cabinet, along with the 
parliament, were speaking the same language. The Coptic minority communities were 
aware at the time that their collective religious identity was at stake. This is due to the 
fact that Copts have never been ruled by Islamists at least throughout their modern 
history. As the narratives expressed by the interviewees will elaborate (chapter 4), 
ordinary Christians felt that they were given a second-class placement due to religious 
rationalizations while the Islamists were in office. This has enhanced the already 
worsening perceptions of unequal citizenship they had developed since the Islamization 
wave they encountered during Sadat’s era.  
Understanding the threats Christians perceived due to the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
rise to power is incomplete without addressing first the religious foundations upon which 
the Brothers’ political project is established. Two main principles are to be provided in 
this regard: the Brotherhood’s conception of the state and their perceptions of the role of 
sharī‘a in society. While the first section of this chapter explores how the Muslim 
Brotherhood perceives both of the state and of the role of sharī‘a in society, the second 
part addresses the sociopolitical implications resulting from adopting such as 
conceptualizations on the Coptic community in particular.  
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Main Tenets of the Brotherhood’s Project 
Recreation the Islamic Caliphate   
The Muslim Brotherhood makes no separation between religion and state. For them, 
Islam should cover every single aspect of a Muslim’s life. Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), 
the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, made this point clear when he argued that “Islam 
is worship and leadership, religion and state, spirituality and work, prayer and jihad, 
obedience and rule, Mushaf [the Qur’an] and sword.”43 While explaining the foundations 
of the Brotherhood’s da‘wa (call), al-Banna indicated that “Islam is a comprehensive 
system, which touches upon all dimensions of Muslims’ life. It is a state and a nation; a 
government and umma.”44  
In his turn, Sayyid Quṭub (1906-1966), the most influential theorist not only for 
the Brotherhood but for all radical Islamist movements, argued that Islam provides a 
comprehensive methodology that should be followed by the Muslim community on both 
the individual and the communal levels.
45
 According to the Brotherhood’s reasoning, 
everything on earth, including the state, is owned by God and nothing is left for Caesar.  
As al-Banna has put it:  
It is not our choice that politics is deemed an integral part of religion, and Islam 
governs rulers and ruled. Giving back to Caesar what is Caser’s and to God what 
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is God’s does not exist in Islam. Rather, Caesar and all he possesses are owned by 
Allah, the one, the prevailing.
46
 
 
For the Brothers, it is not only the citizens who should abide by the Islamic doctrine but 
also the state itself. Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (1926-), the Muslim Brotherhood’s main theorist 
and spiritual leader, contended that the Islamic state is deemed one of the divinely 
revealed rites, and hence establishing an Islamic state is a precondition for creating a 
purely Islamic community.
47
 Al-Qaraḍāwī provided the following five reasons explaining 
why the Islamic state is of great importance to Islam itself. For him, the state protects the 
Islamic creed, maintains religious rites and acts of devotion, educates Muslims in the 
basic ethics of Islam, implements Islamic laws and regulations, and prepares the umma 
for jihad once needed.
48
  
The state in the Brotherhood’s collective mind is an Islamic caliphate-type of rule, 
which had been established in 622 when the Prophet Muhammad created what they 
thought the first “Islamic state” in Medina until it was demolished by MustafaّKemal 
Atatürk in 1924. Historically, the Brotherhood as an entity was established in 1928 
meaning that its inception came only four years after the collapse of the Ottoman 
caliphate. Arguably, it can be contended that the movement came as a direct response to 
the breakdown of the caliphate system, and hence its ultimate goal has been the 
restoration of the caliphate since then. 
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The Islamic caliphate in al-Banna’s thought is not only a symbol of Islamic unity but 
more importantly it is an Islamic rite, and hence Muslims in general and the Brothers in 
particular should pursue all possible means to regain it.
49
 Abul ‘Alā Maudūdī (1903-
1979), a Pakistani Islamic philosopher whose writings have hugely influenced al-Banna’s 
and Quṭub’s thinking, claimed that the first Islamic state established in al-Medina was in 
its essence an Islamic caliphate.
50
 By the same token, Muhammad ‘Imāra (1931-), a 
conservative Islamic writer attached to the Muslim Brotherhood, assumed that regaining 
the caliphate is a religious duty that should be undertaken by the Islamic awakening’s 
affiliates.
51
  
Conceiving the Islamic state in such a broader sense requires demolishing existing 
geographical borders which separate Islamic countries. Thus, the Brothers tend to favor 
non-nation state entities, such as the Islamic community or umma, over the current 
nation-state model. This is due to the fact that the former is deemed the most effective 
bond unifying Muslims around the world. In other words, the Brotherhood’s thinkers pay 
more attention to religious faith, rather than political borders while thinking of the state. 
Several decades ago, al-Banna has made this point clear stating that “[c]ontrary to others 
who believe in the geographical boundaries while thinking of nationalism, nationalism in 
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our perception is bounded by faith. Hence, each spot where there is a Muslim who says 
‘there is no God but Allah’ is considered our homeland.”52  
As a result, it should come as no surprise that Muhammad Mahdī ‘Ākif (1928-), 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s 7th Supreme Guide, announced publicly that he did not 
recognize the geographical borders existing among the Islamic countries. In a well-
remembered journalistic interview held in 2005, ‘Ākif pointed out that “Muslims are one 
umma, where there is no difference between Malaysians, Egyptians and Saudis … the 
Islamic caliphate ruled the entire Arabic and Islamic world … This tells us that Islam is 
the citizenship.”53 
Accordingly, ‘Ākif did not consider Egypt under Ottoman rule an occupied 
country, nor did he care if a Malaysian caliph would come and rule Egypt simply because 
Muslims around the world are perceived as one community.
54
 Evidently, ‘Ākif was not 
the first Brotherhood leader who envisaged the Islamic faith as the sole social marker of 
citizenship. Several decades ago, Sayyid Quṭub stated that the “Islamic faith is the only 
citizenship marker recognized in Islam, under which Arabs, Romans, Persians and all 
other nationalities are deemed equal figures living under Allah’s flag.”55 Similarly, al-
Qaraḍāwī confirmed that the Islamic linkage is superior to all other associations be it 
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social, ethnic or blood-related bonds.”56 He went on arguing that “any Muslim is closer to 
his fellow Muslim than to any other infidel, even if the latter was his father, mother, or 
brother.”57 
Since its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has embarked on such universal - 
type of da‘wa, benefiting from the distinctive nature of Islam as a universal religion. 
Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood’s eventual goal exceeds the construction of both a 
Muslim society and an Islamic country heading towards establishing an entire Islamic 
world for the common good of the whole globe. 
58
 
In order to achieve this task, the Muslim Brotherhood adopts a fully-fledged 
strategy by which the caliphate system can be restored on the global level. According to a 
written manuscript found in a villa owned by a Brotherhood member in Switzerland, this 
strategy includes 12-incremental steps towards regaining the caliphate.
59 
The proposed 
plan, written in 1982, calls for employing all possible means starting from peaceful 
da‘wa to violent jihad if necessary to impose Islamic sharī‘a laws in local communities 
on one hand, recreating the Islamic caliphate on the other.
60
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The Application of Sharī‘a   
The underlying causes which motivated Egyptian revolutionary youth to occupy Egypt’s 
main streets and squares on January 25 were to bring about social equality and freedom 
for all Egyptians. The main slogans raised at the time were ‘Aish, Hurriyya, ‘Adāla 
Ijtimaiyya (Breed, Freedom, and Social Justice). However, these human dignity-related 
slogans were replaced by “Islāmiyya, Islāmiyya” only after six months in the sharī‘a  
Friday millioniyya on July 29, 2011. 
While implementing sharī‘a was never thought of or raised throughout the 18-
days of the revolution, the Sharī‘a Friday’s main demands were the assertion of Egypt’s 
Islamic identity and the implementation of sharī‘a. Despite that the Islamization of the 
2011 uprising had begun several months earlier when al-Qaraḍāwī led the Friday 
ceremony on 20 February,
61
 it can be contended that the “spirit of Tahrir Square” was 
substantially undermined due to the Sharī‘a  Friday.  
 The call for the implementation of sharī‘a was not noticed only in the massive 
rallies which were primarily led by the Brothers and Salafis, but also in Islamist political 
party platforms. For instance, the Freedom and Justice Party (the MB’s political party) 
asserted in the very beginning of its platform that “the Islamic sharī‘a, which the 
majority of Egyptians believe in, is deemed the fundamental marj‘iyya (reference) upon 
which the Party is established.”62 In addition, Islamic sharī‘a law was given a top priority 
in the MB’s Party platform, in that the first Principle in the platform’s first Chapter, 
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entitled “Foundations and Starting Points”, which states that “the principles of Islamic 
sharī‘a are the main sources of legislation.”63  
The pressing question is why sharī‘a was given such as advanced priority in  the 
Brotherhood’s agenda where the other sociopolitical issues inciting the revolution had not 
yet been resolved at that time? A profound gaze at the Islamist’s tradition reveals that 
establishing a sharī‘a state is considered a top priority not only for the Brothers but for all 
other Islamist movements.
64
 Creating an Islamic state is not, however, an end for its own 
sake in the Brothers’ thought. Rather, it is only a vehicle which helps applying the 
sharī‘at Allah on earth, the Brothers’ ultimate mission.  
The key point of departure in the Brothers’ scholarship is the idea that Allah is the 
sole source of legislation for mankind. Transforming this broad idea into a more robust 
conceptualization, Maudūdī coined the concept of al-hākimiyya (sovereignty), which 
                                                          
63
 Ibid. 
 
64
 It is worth mentioning that advocates of the shar‘atization of society and state 
do not represent all schools of thought existing in Islam. In fact, there is another 
progressive Islamic tradition adopts contradictory arguments regarding the role of 
religion in politics in general and real meaning of sharī‘a and its role in society in 
particular. To be sure, this liberal Islamic discourse is not dominating Egypt’s public 
sphere compared to the traditional Islamic one due to two main reasons. First, the 
Egyptian military’s defeat in 1967 has given way to the escalation of Islamism which 
culminated during the Sadat’s reign over the 1970s. The shocking defeat of the 1967 war 
enforced both ordinary people and leading social forces to searching for an alternative to 
the “imported failure solutions”- namely nationalism and secularism, which were 
responsible of the al-Naksa (the military defeat). Back then, the proposed alternative was 
the religious faith, translated into reality through a systematic Islamization of Egyptian 
society. Second, the liberal Islamic project lacks essential logistics needed for promotion 
such as media outlets and money, whereas the Brothers’ and Salafis’ discourses have 
constantly been generously funded by the petro-Islamic countries.   
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literally means that Allah is the only one who has the right to legislate for the people.
65
 
Drawing on Maudūdī‘s writings, Quṭub has extensively elaborated on al-hākimiyya and 
al-jāhiliyya (period of ignorance).66 In fact, the legacy of Quṭub has frequently been 
utilized by all radical Islamist groups to legitimize their violence against the regime or 
society. According to Quṭub, al-hākimiyya and al-jāhiliyya are two sides of the same 
coin. More specifically, al-jāhiliyya occurs when hākimiyyat Allah is violated by 
transferring rights of legislation to His mankind.
67
 According to this understanding, 
Quṭub concluded that “the entire modern world lives in Gāhiliyya.”68 
Although the main goal in this part is to explain how the Muslim Brotherhood 
perceives sharī‘a and its roles in society rather than arguing against these perceptions, it 
is worth elaborating a bit more on the gap exists between the MB and other Islamist 
traditions in conceptualizing sharī‘a and the role it plays in society. 
Despite the fact that sharī‘a as a primary source for legislation has been 
emphasized in the Brotherhood’s thought, one would be astonished to discover that the 
word sharī‘a and its derivations have been mentioned four times69 only throughout the 
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Qur’an. More importantly, sharī‘a in the four instances referred to a totally different 
meaning than legislation. Specifically, neither sharī‘a/shir‘a as a noun nor shara‘a as a 
verb was employed in the Qur’an to refer to legislation or law enforcement. This 
conclusion is based on the actual usage of the word either in the Arabic language or in the 
Qur’anic text as Muhammad Sa‘īd al-‘Ashmāwī has stated.70 According to al-‘Ashmāwī 
(1932-2013), a former Egyptian Supreme Court judge, the word sharī‘a/shir‘a in the 
noun form is employed in Arabic and in Qur’an to mean the approach or the road leading 
to something, whereas shara‘a as a verb means to make something clear.71 
Based on this type of understanding to the real meaning of sharī‘a,72 liberal 
Islamists diminish the essence of the Islamic sharī‘a state as claimed by the Brotherhood. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
thee upon an open way of the Command; therefore follow it, and follow not the caprices 
of those who do not know” (45:18). Furthermore, it was utilized as a verb in two times as 
follows: “He has laid down for you as religion that He charged Noah with, and that We 
have revealed to thee, and that We charged Abraham with, Moses and Jesus: 'Perform the 
religion, and scatter not regarding it (42:13); “Or have they associates who have laid 
down for them as religion that for which God gave not leave?”(42:21). Moreover, a final 
derivation of shir’a was used only once as it follows: “To every one of you We have 
appointed a right way and an open road” (5:48).  
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Thus, reformist Islamists distinguish between religious faith and teachings that are purely 
sent by Allah and other historical inventions introduced by man; between religion as a 
sacred text and Muslims’ religiosity.73 Broadly, Islam in the reformist Islamist’s views is 
a mere religious faith, and hence it is not a din wa dawla (religion and state) as the 
Brotherhood’s thinkers have always assumed.74 For Bassam Tibi, “Islam is a faith and a 
cultural system that determines a way of life for ordinary Muslims. Islam is not a 
framework for a political state order.”75 Thus, Abdullahi An-Na‘im confirmed that 
establishing an Islamic state, whose main function is to coercively applying sharī‘a, 
would definitely undermine the essence of Islam as a merely leverage assists maintaining 
social capital among Muslim communities.
76
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Sulṭa fī al-Islām (Beirut: al-Mrkaz al-Thaqāfī al-‘Arabī, 2000); ‘Abd al-Jawwād Yassīn, 
Al-Dīn wa al-Tadayun (Beirut: al-Tanwīr, 2012). 
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Taken the liberal Islamic tradition
77
 into consideration, it becomes clear that Hassan al-
Banna was talking about politics not about religion while sending his infamous letters to 
the kings and prime ministers of the entire Islamic world in 1936. These letters contain 
fifty main demands by which the Islamic umma can regain its glorious history as al-
Banna claimed.
78
 The second of these demands calls for “restructuring laws so as to 
matching with the Islamic legislations, especially concerning the crimes and hudud 
[punishments].”79 
Similarly, the al-hākimiyya and al-jāhiliyya tradition introduced by al-Mudūdi 
and Quṭub should be dealt with as being “religionized-politics” advancements not sacred 
discourses revealed by Allah. Moreover, the wide variety of slogans that have been 
generated since the emergence of the Brothers, such as “Islam is the solution,” “Qur’an is 
our constitution,” and “Islam is din wa dawla,” are all set to expressing political concerns 
rather than divinely religious issues. 
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Sociopolitical Implications for Copts 
Having defined the two main tenets characterizing the Brotherhood’s political project 
(the restoration of caliphate and the enforcement of sharī‘a law), it is appropriate to move 
on to exploring how the Brotherhood’s rise to power influenced the positioning of non-
Muslims in general and Copts in particular. In order to understand the threats non-
Muslims perceived while Islamists were in office, it is crucial to explain first how the 
Muslim Brothers perceive Islam especially when it is compared to other religions. To 
begin with, the Brothers’ thinkers believe in the supremacy of Islam over all other 
religions, since they think Islam is the only true religion revealed by Allah while all other 
Abrahamic religions have been distorted. 
Sayyid Quṭub, for instance, contends that Islam is the superior religion among all 
other religions, pagan creeds, philosophies, and distorted scriptures. For him, Islam 
provides the perfect type of knowledge about the nature of Allah, and hence Muslim 
believers are superior to all their counterparts following other religious creeds.
80
 
Furthermore, al-Qaraḍāwī assumes that faith in Allah has never been known rightfully in 
the West. This is due to that the Western Christianity, as for him, is not the authentic 
version revealed by God but rather a distorted form that had been advanced by the 
Roman Emperor Constantine and the Council of Nicaea.
81
 The nature of Christ in this 
fabricated version, al-Qaraḍāwī continues, was substantially changed from being one of 
God’s servants to be worshiped like God.82 In “Islam is the solution”, Muhammad ‘Imāra 
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confirms that “the Islamic umma has the sole authentic revelation among other existing 
divinely books, since Allah Almighty Himself had pledged to preserve it.” 83  
 The perceived superiority of Islam/Muslims over other religions/believers 
dominates the Brotherhood’s traditional literature. This type of reasoning is definitely 
undermining the social and cultural positioning of non-Muslims, especially those living 
among a majoritarian Muslim community like Copts. Unfortunately, the Islamic 
supremacy narrative is not to be found only in the writings of the Brothers but in the 
mainstream media and more dangerously in peoples’ daily interactions. The following 
section addresses the sociopolitical implications resulting from adopting such 
exclusionary traditions on non-Muslims in general and on Copts in particular. 
 
The Dhimma Status and the Jizya Payment  
In the sharī‘a state envisioned by the Brotherhood’s theorists, non-Muslims, including 
Copts, are not eligible to receive equal rights to that of Muslims. This is due to the fact 
that non-Muslims living in an Islamic state, according to the sharī‘a  state’s advocates, 
are given a dhimma status which transforms them into ahl dhimma rather than being 
ordinary citizens like Muslim citizens.
84
 This is how the Qur’anic word dhimma has 
mistakenly been interpreted by the Muslim Brotherhood’s scholars. To be sure, the word 
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dhimma has been utilized in two instances only in the Qur’an85 in the noun form 
(dhimma), meaning a treaty or an agreement.
86
 Thus, while the word dhimma was never 
used in Qur’an to identify a certain group of people, it was later employed in the 
Islamist’s tradition to exclusively describe the People of the Book, namely Jews and 
Christians.
87
    
Another controversial concept associated with the dhimma status is the jizya. 
According to the Brotherhood’s reasoning, non-Muslims are deemed a group of people 
protected by the Islamic state due to the dhimma contract they are granted. Therefore, 
they are expected to pay the jizya (poll-tax) in exchange for this protection. Al-Qaraḍāwī, 
for example, asserted that non-Muslims are not religiously required to pay the Zakāh (an 
obligatory tax every Muslim must pay) or to get involved in the actions of jihad, and 
therefore they are expected to pay the jizya.
88
 “If some of our fellow Christians dislike the 
word jizya,” al-Qaraḍāwī elaborated, “they can call it whatever they want… ahl al- 
dhimma can be changed as well in case it intimidates Copts.”89  
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In fact, the real issue here is not whether using the word ahl al-dhimma antagonizes 
Copts or not as al-Qaraḍāwī has simplistically put it. Rather, it is about depriving non-
Muslims in general and Copts in particular of one of their political rights as being equal 
citizens using religious claims. In addition, non-Muslims living in Islamic states are 
straightforwardly granted a second-class placement once such religiously justified 
conceptualizations are put in effect. Ironically, while the dhimma status and the jizya 
payment completely undermine equal citizenship rights of non-Muslims and are seen by 
them as a sociopolitical stigma, the Brothers consider both as privileges. Al-Qaraḍāwī, 
for instance, argues that the notion of ahl al-dhimma is not perceived in the Islamic 
sharī‘a as a sign of non-Muslims’ defamation or offence, rather it is a symbol of custody 
and fulfillment towards non-Muslims.
90
     
 
Distribution of State Positions  
Aside from the absence of full citizenship due to the dhimma status and the required 
jizya, Copts are not allowed to occupy certain types of posts in the proposed sharī‘a state. 
While they can have access to, for instance, low-profile positions they can never get 
access to the so-called al-wilaya al-‘amma (central authority).91  
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Qur’an. The following are just a few examples: “Let not the believers take the 
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Posts of al-wilaya al-‘amma are not well specified by Islamic thinkers, and hence vary 
from an Islamic school to another. For some, al-wilaya al-amma’s positions are limited to 
both the presidency and the military’s top leadership.92 For others, such as al-Qaraḍāwī, 
they however are expanded to include all judicial posts, different types of religiously-
based positions such as those that are involved in managing the Muslims’ zakat, and key 
executive posts influencing a state’s decision-making processes.93 Taking the term to the 
extreme, al-Qaraḍāwī argued that non-Muslims should not serve in the military in the 
first place. Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood’s former Supreme Guide Mustafa Mashūr 
contended in an interview that Copts are not trusted to serve in the military and to defend 
the nation, and hence they should pay the jizya in return.
94
 Although al-Qaraḍāwī himself 
grants Copts the right to become members of parliament, this right is however enjoyed 
only so long as the vast majority of the parliament’s seats are held by Muslims.95 
                                                                                                                                                                             
hardliners Brothers so as to depriving non-Muslims of the same rights of Muslims, other 
scholars tend to interpret these verses significantly differently. Muhammad al-Ghazālī 
(1917-1996), a renowned Egyptian Islamic preacher and scholar, emphasized the 
historical circumstances surrounding the time of its revelation. He contended that these 
verses were sent in the midst of the then ongoing war status existed between Muslims and 
their enemies, and therefore the kāfirīn (infidels) in these verses refer only to the 
Muslim’s warriors of the time. For further elaboration, see: Muhammad al-Ghazālī, Al-
Ta‘asub wa al-Tasāmuh bayn al-Masīhiyya wa al-Islām (Cairo: Nahdat Misr, 2005), 38. 
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If this is the case regarding posts of al-wilaya al-‘amma, it can be argued that there is a 
consensus among all Islamist movements including the MB that non-Muslims are not 
eligible to hold al-wilaya al-‘udhma96 (the presidency) in an Islamic state based on 
religious foundations. Al-Qaraḍāwī, for example, asserts that the Islamic state is an 
“ideological state”, and hence the president of an Islamic state is the “Prophet’s deputy 
whose main job is to guarding religion and governing people with religion.”97  
 
Rights of Non-Muslims to Building Places of Worship  
In the Islamic sharī‘a state envisioned by the Brothers, attitudes towards building and 
renovating places of worship belonging to non-Muslims provide another manifestation of 
religious discrimination. Theoretically, there is a consensus not only among the 
Brotherhood’s thinkers but among almost all Islamists that freedom of religion and 
worship of non-Muslims must be maintained on religious grounds. The Qur’anic verse 
stating that “No compulsion is there in religion,”98 has always been utilized advocating 
Islam’s tolerance towards non-Muslims. Transforming this virtual right into reality by 
allowing for the construction of places of worship for non-Muslims is a problematic 
issue, however. 
 
                                                          
96
 While al-wilāya al-‘amma refers to key positions of state including the 
presidency, al-wilāya al-‘udhma refers solely to the presidency. 
 
97
 Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, Al-Dīn wa al-Siyāsa (Dublin: Al-Majlis Al-‘Urūbī lil       
’Ifta’ wa Al-Buhūth, 2007), 159. 
 
98
 Qur’an (2:256). 
40 
 
Al-Qaraḍāwī, for instance, argues that non-Muslims living in an Islamic country should 
respect common feelings of Muslims not performing their rites in public nor building 
new churches in cities which had no previous churches.
99
 Generally, traditional Islamic 
scholars distinguish between two different types of non-Muslims’ places of worship. The 
first includes houses of worship that had been established on territories that were not 
considered a part of dār al-Islam (house of Islam). The second type contains new holy 
places non-Muslims want to construct in one of newly established cities of dār al-Islam.  
The general rule put forward by the Brotherhood’s classical preachers has been 
that while the former places of worship (i.e., old houses of worship) are allowed to be 
maintained and refurbished if destroyed, the latter holy houses (i.e., new places of 
worship) is religiously prohibited.
100
 Muhammad Abdullah al-Khatīb (1929-2015), a 
former Mufti of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic preacher, issued an infamous fatwa 
(Islamic legal statement) during the 1980s prohibiting church construction in newly 
established Egyptian cities. According to al-Khatīb, Copts are not allowed to build new 
churches in the then emergent cities, such as Ma‘adi and the 10th of Ramadan, since these 
new cities were originally built by Muslims, meaning that they are integral parts of dar 
al-Islam.
101
    
                                                          
99
 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Ghayr al-Muslimīn, 15. 
 
100
 Maudūdī, Huqūk Ahl al-dhimma, 22-23. 
 
101
 Mariz Tadros, The Muslim Brotherhood, 109-110; ‘Abd al-Rahīm ‘Alī, 
“Muhammad ‘Abd Allah al-Khaṭīb wa Fatāwāh al-Muhariḍa ‘alā al-Fitna, 
http://www.islamist-movements.com/26244.  
41 
 
Relatedly, the Brotherhood’s thinkers agreed that having a permission to building non-
Muslims’ places of worship from walī al-’amr should be given in advance.102 
Historically, since the al-khat al-Hamayuni (Hamayuni Edict) advanced in 1856, the 
“walī al-’amr” has been deemed the sultan or who became later the president. That is, 
building or renovating a church in Egypt, for example, needed a presidential signature 
which has been the case over the last fifteen decades.
103
 However, this policy has recently 
been changed in August 2016 when the Egyptian parliament approved a new church 
building law,
104
 by which these permissions are to be given by local governors rather than 
the president.
105
 
Despite the importance of adopting such a relatively more advanced legal step 
towards regulating non-Muslims’ religious affairs, the underlying concern lies more in 
the hostile religious discourse that has been advanced against Copts over the decades. 
This discourse has eventually made it difficult for local Muslim communities to accept 
the idea of having churches inside their neighborhoods. Thus, it is not surprising to 
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discover that the vast majority of sectarian conflict in Egypt over the past several decades 
is mainly attributed to church construction/renovation-related issues.
106
 
Given the previously mentioned sociopolitical implications, it has become clear 
that Copts are given second-class citizenship due to religiously-based theories advanced 
mostly by the Brothers and Salafis. Moreover, bearing in mind the underlying 
foundations shaping the Brotherhood’s political project helps understand several actions 
and decisions adhered by the Brotherhood’s leaders since the 2011 uprising. 
Retrospectively, it is understandable now why President Musri missed what Jason 
Brownlee described as a “golden opportunity for interfaith accord” with Copts by not 
appearing in the enthronement ceremony of Pope Tawadros II.
107
 As Paul Rowe has 
argued, Mursī’s absence “raised complaints from Copts who feared that it indicated an 
increasingly disdainful attitude for Christians within the regime.”108 Furthermore, it is 
obvious now why the entire Coptic community living across Egypt’s governorates were 
given only presidential permission to construct an “apartment-sized” church during the 
Brotherhood’s one - year tenure. 109  
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Relatedly, yet on the societal level, the discriminatory religious discourse towards non-
Muslims has cultivated patterns of sectarian beliefs and attitudes adopted by ordinary 
Muslim citizens. Sectarian tensions erupted in Qena once a Coptic figure was announced 
its governor in April 2011, for instance. This appointment has led to a wave of fierce riots 
and mass protests, led primarily by local Islamist leaders, sweeping across the entire 
governorate.
110
 As Mariz Tadros concluded, “it was the religion of the governor that 
served to unify all the different parties into one alliance, not the demand for a civil, 
democratically-elected governor.”111 
It is crucial to note that non-Muslims throughout the Brothers’ religious discourse 
refer exclusively to the Abrahamic religions’ followers, namely Jews and Christians. 
Utilizing such as narrow conceptualizations, non-Muslims are deprived of their basic 
human rights on religious accounts as it was illustrated throughout this chapter. However, 
religious rights and freedoms of non- Muslims on the broader sense, i.e., followers of the 
non-Abrahamic religions or others following no religion, are not recognized in the 
Brotherhood’s thinking in the first place. To mention only one example, Mahmūd 
Ghozlān, a prominent member of the Brotherhood’s Guidance Office, confirmed that 
non-Muslims other than the People of the Book do not have the right to worship in an 
Islamic state. 
112
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The Coptic Response  
Copts were aware of the potentially devastating consequences resulting from the 
establishment of the Brotherhood’s proposed Islamic sharī‘a state. For them, the 
ascendancy of Islamists to power would not only endanger their sociopolitical position 
but also Egypt’s identity and its civilian nature. This explains why religious minorities in 
the broader Middle East tend to support authoritarian regimes, sustaining the status quo 
and hence preserving their positioning. Based on a comparative field work conducted in 
several Middle East countries, Ceren Belge and Ekrem Karakoç concluded that religious 
minorities in the Middle East (i.e., Egypt and Jordan) are more likely to support 
autocratic regimes compared to the majority populations.
113
  
 This is attributed to three main reasons according to the authors. First, non-
Muslims have enjoyed greater autonomy over their socioeconomic affairs since the 
Ottoman era, which considered them as distinct communities deserving state protection. 
Second, the Ottoman policies have eventually helped increase non-Muslims’ economic 
powers particularly in the post-independence era. Third, Arab nation-states have been 
deemed the main guarantor of secularism, and consequently religious minorities have 
been hesitant to undermine states’ authoritarian institutions which have assisted 
preserving their sociopolitical status over years.
114
  
 These results were visible on the ground in Egypt when pope Shenouda publicly 
supported the Mubarak regime during the 2011 uprisings, calling on Copts not to 
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participate in protests and to stay at home instead, praying for Egypt.
115
 However, the rise 
of Islamists following the revolution has ushered in a new relationship pattern between 
the Coptic community as a whole on one hand and the state on the other. The following 
section explores these new patterns of interactions, analyzing the Coptic responses on 
both church-state level and ordinary individual level.  
 
Reactions on Church Level 
As for the relations between the church and the newly emergent Islamist regime, it was 
the first time in Egyptian Christianity’s long history that leaders of the five largest 
Christian denominations
116
 got together forming an Egyptian Council of Churches.
117
 The 
Christian coalition, which was established on February 18, 2013, aimed at defending the 
interests and concerns of Egypt’s Christian communities. Furthermore, it tried to generate 
a sense of belonging among all Egyptian Christians during times of uncertainty and fears 
sweeping Egypt’s sphere at the time. More importantly, it sought to establish a counter 
coalition before the then Islamist ruling front led by the Brothers and Salafis. 
 Another manifestation of growing tensions in church-state interactions could be 
noticed in the revolutionary stances taken by the newly elected Patriarch at the time: pope 
Tawadros. Broadly, it can be assumed that unspoken pacts have been established between 
the leadership of the Coptic Orthodox Church and successive Egyptian presidents since 
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Nasser (see the literature review section). According to these informal pacts, the general 
rule has been that issues and concerns of the Copts are to be handled between top 
officials from both sides (i.e., state and church) behind closed doors. It seems, however, 
that the rise of Islamists to power put an end to these long-established pacts.  
 Specifically, Tawadros publicly blamed Mursī and the state apparatus, holding 
them responsible for the April 7, 2013 assault on the Coptic Orthodox Cathedral in 
Abbassiyya. In fact, it was the first time through its long history that the Coptic Cathedral 
was attacked. While commenting on the unprecedented assault on the Cathedral in a 
televised interview, Tawadros stated that “attacking the Cathedral exceeded all red lines 
and limits anyone can imagine … The Cathedral, which is deemed Egypt’s national 
symbol, has never been attacked through its 2000-year-old history, even during worst 
historical junctures.”118 Furthermore, he publicly accused Mursī of not keeping his 
promises indicating that “president Mursī had promised me to do everything he could to 
protect the Cathedral, but none of his promises was maintained in reality.”119  
 During the drafting of the 2012 constitution, it was clear that the Brothers and 
Salafis were drafting a purely Islamic constitution. It is worth mentioning that Islamists 
were dominating the Constituent Assembly, where 66 out of its 100 members were 
Islamists.
120
 Hence, it was not surprising that the committee refused any changes to 
Article 2 of the suspended constitution, for instance, stating that “Islam is the religion of 
the state, Arabic is its formal language, and the principles of Islamic sharī‘a are the main 
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source of legislation.”121 While Article 2 was deemed problematic for Copts since its 
introduction by Sadat in the 1980s in an effort to placate the Islamists, Article 219 further 
enhanced the already growing fears shared by the Coptic community. According to this 
controversial Article, the principles of sharī‘a were to be derived exclusively from the 
mazahib ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama‘a (the Sunni schools of thought).122 For Copts, this 
Article would jeopardize their position since “Wahhabi sources could be applied or that 
anyone could be given the power to criminalize a certain act.”123 Agreeing with Clark 
Lombardi and Nathan Brown, the Islamic technical language used in writing this Article 
“provides firm evidence, if any was needed, that there were many Islamists in the room 
when this document was drafted.”124 
 Islamizing the constitution could also be recognized in Article 4, which granted 
al-Azhar a significant role in that al-Azhar’s Council of Senior Scholars should be 
consulted in all Islamic law-related matters.
125
 As Lombardi and Brown pointed out, “al-
Azhar as an institution may feel authorized by Article 4 to institutionalize itself as the 
Islamic conscience of the country.”126 Taken the 2012 constitution-related concerns 
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together, it was evident that “the Muslim Brotherhood appeared to be going from 
electoral dominance to institutional hegemony” as Jason Brownlee has indicated.127 
 Responding to the Islamists’ hegemony over the constitution-writing process on 
one hand and their insistence on Islamizing society and state on the other, representatives 
of the Coptic Church withdrew from the Constituent Assembly in objection before the 
final draft was put to a public referendum.
128
 After it was passed, pope Tawadros strongly 
criticized the new constitution in a journalistic interview with the Associated Press, in 
which he demonstrated that:  
The only common bond between all Egyptians is that they are all citizens ... the 
constitution, the base for all laws, must be under the umbrella of citizenship and not 
a religious one … Subsequently, some clauses were distorted by a religious slant and 
that in itself is discrimination because the constitution is supposed to unite and not 
divide.
129
  
 
Responses Adopted on the Individual Level 
Generally, political transformation bears risks as well as threats to religious and ethnic 
minority communities especially in autocratic regimes.
130
 As Samuel Tadros has clearly 
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put it, “it was the wisdom of centuries of persecution that taught minorities the eternal 
lesson of survival: that the persecuting dictator was always preferable to the mob.”131 
Drawing on Coptic religious fears, Talal Asad rightly argued that “the Mubarak regime 
always maintained that it was the only force capable of keeping ‘religious peace’ 
precisely because it suppressed Islamic extremism.”132  
 However, ordinary Copts were not afraid of the speculations that had frequently 
been advocated in the very beginning of the revolution, predicting that Islamists would 
dominate Egypt’s sphere once Mubarak was ousted. Thus, they actively participated in 
the 18-days of the uprisings beside their fellow Muslim citizens, opposing the church’s 
repeated calls to stay at home. At that time, Copts thought that toppling Mubarak’s long-
standing authoritarianism would create a new more religiously tolerant Egypt they had 
been dreaming of. As time passed, they eventually had to encounter what was deemed a 
more problematic concern: “the increase in random mob violence by non-politicized 
Egyptian citizens against them.”133 
  In response to the then growing Islamization of state and society following the 
uprising, many ordinary Copts chose to migrate even before the Brothers officially seized 
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office. The Vatican suggested that up to 100,000 Christians fled the country during the 
first 6 months following the revolution.
134
 Many other Copts, however, chose to engage 
in politics defending their political as well as religious interests. Furthermore, a wide 
array of Coptic movements was established to address Coptic grievances,
135
 such as the 
Maspero Youth Union, the Christian Brotherhood, and the Mina Daniel Movement. 
Throughout the pre-revolution era, ordinary Copts used to raise their demands “within the 
confines of church walls”, using Jayson Casper’s words; however, the new Coptic 
movements which emerged after the rise of Islamists have altered this equation. In other 
words, the ascendance of Islamists to power has motivated ordinary Copts to go beyond 
church fences raising certain religious concerns at public sites and streets, which was 
considered a turning point back then.
136
 
 It was not only the case that Copts got involved in “street politics” due to the rise 
of Islamists, but they also engaged in “real politics”. Despite a lack of robust evidence, it 
was widely speculated that the majority of Copts gave their votes either to Ahmad Shafiq 
or to Hamdin Sabbahi in the first round of the presidential election.
137
 Also, they were 
said to favor Ahmad Shafiq, the ex-prime minister and the old regime’s representative, 
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over Mursī in the run-off.138 Expectedly, ordinary Copts rejected the 2012 “Islamic” 
constitution advanced by the Islamists when put to referendum.
139
 A year before, they 
had been encouraged to say a previous “no” to the 19 March 2011 constitutional 
amendments since “yes” would have accelerated the transmission of power to the 
Brotherhood.
140
  
 Still within Coptic individual reactions, Assistant President Samir Murqus 
resigned his position the day after Mursī issued his constitutional declaration in 
November 22 in condemnation.
141
 A few days later in December 6, the prominent Coptic 
scholar and a close friend of the Brothers, Rafiq Habib, resigned his post as a deputy 
chairman of the Freedom and Justice Party. Habib’s decision came one day after violent 
clashes had ensued between the protestors gathered outside the presidential palace 
demonstrating against Mursī’s declaration and the Brotherhood’s supporters.142  
 Taken the Christians’ reaction adopted on both church and individual levels 
together, it can be assumed that the rise of the Brotherhood following the Arab Spring led 
eventually to the unification of the Coptic community against a common threat: the 
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Islamization of state and society. Evidently, Copts actively participated in the revolution 
from its very beginning “not as Copts but as Egyptians.”143 However, subsequent political 
developments instigated “Copticness” among the Coptic society, driving them towards 
politics not as being Egyptians anymore but as Christians. This transformation has 
undermined the iconic scenes of national unity witnessed in Tahrir Square, where Copts 
were protecting Muslims with their bodies during prayers and vice versa. “To Copts,” 
Marlyn Tadros points out, “the image of the revolution was that which enabled the 
creation of an almost Utopian state of freedoms and liberties, not least of which religious 
freedom.”144 Nonetheless, the Brotherhood’s exclusivity and the subsequent Coptic 
responses have destroyed what was seen at the time as another symbolic moment of 
national unity, resembling Egypt’s national unification of the 1920s.  
 ّ
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CHAPTER III 
The Road to Constructing a Threatened Coptic Identity 
While millions of Muslims and Copts alike were taking to the streets in the 2011 
uprising, a more religiously tolerant and politically democratic Egypt was being 
visualized in the demonstrators’ hearts and minds. “In the tent city of Tahrir Square,” 
Jason Brownlee writes, “Egyptians communed across the state’s ethnic and political 
borders.”145 It can be argued that Muslims and Copts were acting as a unified community 
against Mubarak’s regime. The national unity between Muslims and Christians seen 
throughout the 18-day revolt recalled the corresponding national solidarity that had 
previously been experienced during the campaign against British rule in the 1920s. 
However, the political developments that followed along with the decisions taken by 
political forces at the time, especially the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), have weakened this 
short-lived unification. This, eventually, gave way to the establishment of two conflicting 
identities/communities; the Coptic minority community versus the Muslim majority 
society, each of which started to pursue different goals employing varying strategies.  
The current chapter is divided into two main sections. The first addresses the 
period of unity between Muslims and Copts, arguing that at first ordinary Copts trusted 
the MB as their fellow Muslim citizens did. Back then, Christians hoped that the 
Brotherhood would establish a more democratic country guaranteeing the rights of 
religious minorities, which had frequently been violated by the successive regimes. The 
second section traces changes in the Coptic community’s trust in particular towards the 
Brotherhood after the latter seized power. The main premise is that declining trust in the 
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Brothers has increased levels of political disillusionment among the Christian 
community, which in turn increased the readiness to defect from the whole democratic 
process among Copts, pushing them towards supporting the military.  
 
Changes of Copts’ Trust in the Muslim Brotherhood over Time  
In his seminal work Trust and rule, Charles Tilly has emphasized the crucial influence of 
trust between ruled and ruler on the quality of democracy on one hand and the stability of 
rule on the other.
146
 Tilly has defined trust in terms of risk, arguing that “[t]rust consists 
of placing valued outcomes at risk to others’ malfeasance, mistakes, or failures.”147 This 
type of reasoning is proven right when applied to the political context following the 2011 
revolt, in the sense that ordinary Copts took the risk of trusting the MB. 
In order to examine changes of trust in the MB among Copts and Muslims over 
time, exploring how these changes influenced Copts’ sociopolitical behavior in particular, 
the Arab Barometer (AB) dataset was utilized. Before heading to discussing the results, it 
is important to elaborate first on the type of data as well as the questions employed, 
showing their relevance to the arguments at hand. To begin with, since the first part of 
this chapter seeks to compare levels of trust in the MB among different religious groups 
across different regimes, namely the SCAF-led regime and the MB regime, the AB waves 
II and III were used. Specifically, while wave II contains data addressing instances going 
back to SCAF’s rule (the field work was conducted from June 16-July 3, 2011), wave III 
reflects events which occurred during Mursī’s tenure (data were gathered from March 3- 
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April 7, 2013). The AB datasets, therefore, give an invaluable chance to investigate the 
arguments at hand since they help monitoring changes in attitudes and positions of both 
Copts and Muslims across different transitions under investigation.  
As for the questions employed, trust in the MB was measured using a relevant 
item in which participants were asked to what extend they trusted the MB with a scale 
ranging from 1 (I trust it to a great extent) to 4 (I absolutely do not trust it). Since the 
main purpose here is to distinguish between those who trusted the MB regardless of 
degrees of trust and those who did not trust it at all, a dummy variable measuring general 
trust in the MB was created. That is, citizens who did not trust the MB at all were coded 
2, whereas people who trust it either to a great or a medium or a limited extent were 
coded 1. In order to investigate the relationship between religion and trust in the MB, a 
Chi-Square Test was performed.  
Table 1. Crosstabs between religion and trust in the MB during SCAF’s transition  
           Muslims     Copts 
Trust the MB           Frequency        %              Frequency     %  
Yes     790    69      43    60.6 
No       354             31      28    39.4 
   X
2
(1) = 2.237, p> 0.05 (0.1)          1144  100      71     100 
The results displayed in Table 1 support the assumption suggested: Copts took the risk of 
trusting the MB during SCAF’s tenure as their fellow Muslim citizens did. Specifically, 
no significant relationship was found between religion and trust the MB during SCAF’s 
transition as hypothesized (p> 0.05). Looking at the percentages displayed above reveals 
that large numbers of Copts (60.6%) and Muslims (69%) granted the MB relatively equal 
levels of trust during SCAF’s rule. That is to say, ordinary Copts followed Muslim 
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citizens giving the Brothers a full chance to rule Egypt after the SCAF would hand over 
power to a civilian government as had been pledged. 
These results can be attributed to the fact that Egyptians, including the Coptic 
minority, might have believed frequent promises by the MB’s leadership at the time who 
were assuring the group’s good intentions to participate in, instead of dominating Egypt’s 
politics. For instance, while addressing a crowd in Damanhur (lower Egypt), the MB’s 
Supreme Guide Mohammad Badie stated that the movement would “demonstrate that it is 
a moderate and tolerant group promoting equality for all regardless of religion, colour 
and creed.”148 He went on emphasizing the “participation not domination” slogan, 
reminding his audiences that “the MB group was from the people, with the people and for 
the people.”149 Moreover, in May 2011 Mohamad Mursī, the then head of the MB’s 
newly formed Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), announced that the new party would not 
force Islamic sharī‘a  laws on Egyptians.150 He demonstrated that “[w]e only use Islam as 
the basis of our party ... which means that our general framework is Islamic sharia ... We 
don't issue religious rules in individual cases.”151 In an attempt to resolve growing fears 
that swept across the Coptic community, especially regarding parliamentary 
representation, Mursī pointed out that “we want to see our Christian brothers elected in 
parliament ... We don't want one group to control the parliament, neither the Brotherhood 
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nor anyone else.”152 Furthermore, the MB’s former Supreme Guide Mahdī ‘Ākif declared 
publicly in May 2011 that the organization would not field a presidential candidate.
153
  
As time passed, political developments have clearly shown that “the MB was 
driven by hunger for power fueled by the immense vacuum left after the fall of Mubarak 
and the NDP” as Khalil al-Anani argued.154 In addition, events on the ground proved that 
“the group’s actions were overshadowing its rhetoric” as Jason Brownlee has rightfully 
stated.
155
To mention just a few examples, the Brothers contested the parliamentary 
elections in full capacity after they had pledged a few months earlier that they would 
contest only 35 percent of the parliamentary seats as the MB’s media spokesman Essam 
al-Arian had said.
156 After the MB-led Democratic Alliance won 46% of the 
parliamentary seats,
157
 the Brothers headed towards seizing the presidency as well. In 
another reversal yet on the presidential level, the movement fielded its deputy and strong-
man Khairat al-Shater for the presidency. In an attempt to justify this regression, the 
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FJP’s chairman Muhammad Mursī claimed that "[w]e have chosen the path of the 
presidency not because we are greedy for power but because we have a majority in 
parliament which is unable to fulfill its duties.”158  
A week before assuming office, Mursī had made several promises before a large 
number of Egypt’s political leaders who mostly belonged to the non-Islamist camp and 
who had gathered in the Fairmont Hotel.
159
 The main goal of what came to be known as 
the Fairmont Accord was a discussion of the new political developments that were 
threatening the revolution, especially given that Ahmad Shafiq, a representative of the 
ousted Mubarak regime and of the “deep state”, had become Mursī’s sole competitor in 
the runoff.
160
 These promises varied to include the following: launching a “national unity 
project”; forming a “national salvation government” in which all political forces and 
orientations would be represented; appointing a presidential team representing Egypt’s 
varied political trends; and forming an inclusive constituent assembly in order to draft a 
constitution for all Egyptians.
161
 Eventually, Mursī won the election by a tiny margin of 
                                                          
158
 Kristen Chick, “In Major Reversal, Muslim Brotherhood Will Vie for Egypt's 
Presidency,” TheChristianScience Monitor.com, April 1, 2012, 
www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0401/In-major-reversal-Muslim-
Brotherhood-will-vie-for-Egypt-s-presidency (accessed October 8, 2016). 
 
159
 Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud and Andrew Reynolds, The Arab Spring, 118. 
 
160
 Ibid, 117. 
 
161
 Salma Shukrallah, “Once Election Allies, Egypt's 'Fairmont' Opposition Turn 
against Morsi,” AhramOnline.org, 
June27,2013,www.http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/152/74485/Egypt/Morsi,-
one-year-on/-Once-election-allies,-Egypts-Fairmont-opposition-.aspx (accessed October 
9, 2016); Mariz Tadros, “Settling after the Revolts? Egypt’s Political Settlements and 
Violent Transition,” Evidence Report, 57 (2014): 24.  
59 
 
one percent over his rival Shafiq and became Egypt’s first democratically elected 
president in June 30, 2012.  
Broadly, none of these promises were fulfilled throughout Mursī’s one-year 
tenure, however. More specifically, appointing the politically unknown figure Hisham 
Qandil as prime minister and allocating significant ministries such as higher education, 
housing, manpower, and information were deemed signs undermining “the power-sharing 
spirit of the so-called Fairmont Accord.”162 With regard to the Coptic quest, sectarian 
attacks against Copts and Copts’ holy places “increased in both frequency and 
intensity,”163 reaching a climax in the unprecedented assault on the Coptic Orthodox 
Cathedral in April 7, 2013 (see Chapter 1). Moving to the constitution, Islamists 
dominated the constituent assembly and hence “an overtly religious constitution” was 
advanced.
164
 According to Muqtadar Khan, “the Egyptian constitution, passed by the 
Islamists, fudged on the equality of all citizens by privileging one religion, Islam, over 
others (articles 1 and 2), and subverting the equal status of women and minorities.”165  
On the institutional level, the Brotherhood-ization of the state was further 
consolidated through consecutive cabinet reshuffles, in which the number of Brotherhood 
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members appointed increased.
166
 Throughout his tenure, Mursī “focused more on 
consolidating his party’s power over government institutions than providing good 
governance.”167 Assuming both executive and legislative powers, Mursī took a far-
reaching decision issuing the shocking constitutional declaration of November 22, 2012. 
The declaration, which was deemed by Jason Brownlee as an “auto-golpe,”168 placed the 
presidential office above all state establishments particularly the judiciary system.
169
 
Agreeing with Khan, “the Muslim Brothers did much in a very short time to squander 
their credibility in Egypt.”170  
Table 2. Crosstabs between religion and trust in the MB during Mursī’s transition  
               Muslims     Copts 
       Trust the MB        Frequency        %              Frequency     %  
Yes          353    31.3      19    27.5 
No           774             68.7      50    72.5 
 X
2
(1) = 0.435,  p> 0.05(0.5)               1127  100      69    100 
The previously illustrated bad decisions and policies taken by the Brotherhood, especially 
those that were adopted during Mursī rule, are hence expected to have enhanced worries 
among Copts in particular about the real intentions of the MB compared to Muslims. The 
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results in Table 2 partially support this argument. Specifically, no significant associations 
were found between religion and trust in the MB during Mursī’s period contrary to 
expectation (p> 0.05). However, percentages of distrust among Copts (72.5%) were a bit 
higher than that among Muslims (68.7%), meaning that Copts became a bit more 
skeptical of the MB’s real intentions during Mursī’s transition than Muslims. 
Collectively, it can be argued that while levels of distrust in the MB have increased 
among Muslims and Copts during Mursī’s tenure, percentages of distrust among Copts 
were a bit higher, yet not significantly, than that of Muslims. 
Table 3. Paired Samples Tests identifying changes of trust in the MB within each community over time 
Levels of Trust
171
            N        Mean              t            df         sig (2tailed)          
  
Copts      
During SCAF’s transition            55           2.9          - 4.709       54     0.000     
During Mursī’s transition            55         3.7 
Muslims  
During SCAF’s transition                   1012       2.6           -16.998      1011           0.000     
During Mursī’s transition                    1012       3.4                                       
Note: Higher scores meaning greater levels of distrust  
After exploring patterns of change in levels of trust/distrust in the MB among both 
religious communities across different regimes (i.e., the SCAF and the MB), it is 
important to examine whether these patterns were changing over time within each 
individual community or not. For the Coptic society, Paired Samples’ results (Table 3) 
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sustain the premise at hand: levels of distrust towards the MB during Mursī’s transition 
were significantly higher (M=3.7) than during SCAF’s period (M=2.9) [Paired Samples 
Test (54)= - 4.709, P=0.000]. With regard to the Muslim community, the results did not 
support the other half of the argument presented. The findings (Table 3) reveal that levels 
of distrust in the MB among Muslims have also increased during Mursī’s presidency 
(M=3.4) compared to their counterparts during SCAF’s transition (M=2.6) [Paired 
Samples Test (1011)= -16.998, P=0.000]. These results indicate that general distrust in 
the MB has increased among religious groups over time. Looking at the means of distrust 
above shows that Copts tended to distrust the MB (M=3.7) more than Muslims (M=3.4). 
Generally, the results presented in the previous three tables are partially supportive of the 
main theoretical argument suggested. More specifically, Copts were inspired by the 
“spirit of Tahrir Square” giving equal trust to the MB as those of Muslim citizens during 
SCAF’s transition. What occurred afterwards was that general trust in the MB has 
statistically deteriorated among both Copts and Muslims. However, degrees of distrust in 
the MB among Copts remained a bit higher than their counterparts shared by Muslims 
over the two transitions. 
Satisfaction with Government’s Performance between Religious Groups over Time        
Another manifestation indicating how the MB’s ascendance to power was posing a real 
threat to Copts compared to Muslims could be noticed in the contradictory positions each 
group held towards the government’s performance. Satisfaction with the government’s 
performance was tested utilizing relevant question asking respondents whether they were 
satisfied/dissatisfied with the government’s performance. Answers provided ranged from 
0 (absolutely unsatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). 
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Table 4. Paired Samples Tests identifying differences in satisfaction with governments among Muslims 
and Copts over time 
Satisfaction Levels            N        Mean          t          df          sig (2-tailed)           
Muslims     
 Satisfaction with SCAF’s government         1111          5.7       -2.110     1110 0.03     
Satisfaction with Mursī’s government         1111          7  
Copts 
Satisfaction with SCAF’s government          61            6          9.102       60 0.000     
Satisfaction with Mursī’s government          61            2.4                                   
Note: Higher means meaning greater levels of satisfaction  
The results presented in Table 4 enhance the argument presented. Specifically, the Paired 
Samples Tests demonstrate that general satisfaction with the performance of Mursī’s 
government among Muslims (M=7) was comparatively higher than their satisfaction with 
SCAF’s government (M=5.7) [Paired Samples Test (1110)= -2.110, P=0.03]. By 
contrast, levels of satisfaction with Mursī’s government among Copts were statistically 
lower (M=2.4) than their satisfaction with SCAF’s government (M=6) [Paired Samples 
Test (60)= 9.102, P=0.000]. Generally, these results are in congruence with the main 
hypothesis proposed in that each community was evaluating the same government’s 
performance significantly differently. Initially, evaluations hence were based on 
beforehand suppositions rather than relying on substantive factors.  
 
Implications on Minority-Related Politics  
Distrust in the incumbent has its own consequences on citizens in general and on 
minority-related politics in particular. This section explores how these implications are 
linked with a certain array of concerns challenging minorities in transitions in general. 
Three main worries are provided in this regard: the potentiality of establishing a new 
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dictatorship, the rise of communal apathy, and the willingness to defect from the 
democratic process as a whole. The remainder of this chapter discusses each one of these 
concerns in a separate part.   
 
Musrī’s Rule: A New Islamist Dictatorship  
Charles Tilly has introduced a political process-oriented definition highlighting the main 
features distinguishing democratic regimes from other types of rule. Tilly argues that:  
a regime is democratic insofar as it maintains broad citizenship, equal 
citizenship, binding consultation of citizens at large with respect to 
governmental activities and personnel, as well as protection of citizens from 
arbitrary actions by governmental agents.
172
 
By this standard, it can be hypothesized that Mubarak’s long dictatorship was replaced by 
a newly established one, yet with an “Islamist” face seen during Mursī’s tenure.173 
Methodologically, three relevant questions were selected to evaluate the general 
assessment of Mursī’s regime as perceived by Copts. Arguably, these three questions 
address the four main principles featuring democratic regimes as suggested in Tilly’s 
definition. Specifically, tapping on both broad citizenship and consultation, the first 
question asked interviewees to evaluate the general status of democracy andaf human 
rights on a scale of 1 (very good) to 5 (very bad). The second question taps into the issue 
of equality, in which participants were asked whether they were receiving equal treatment 
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compared to other citizens under different regimes. Responses given ranged from 1 (to a 
great extent) to 4 (not at all). The final question signifies the protection principle, in 
which respondents were asked whether they were able to criticize the government 
without fear or not. Answers given to this question were either 1 (yes) or 2 (no). A final 
composite scale aggregating scores of the three questions together was created, 
measuring whether the MB was establishing democracy or autocracy in the perception of 
Copts. Scores of the final scale ranged from 3 to 11, where greater points mean that the 
regime was perceived as more autocratic. 
Table 5. Paired Samples Tests measuring differences in assessment of status of democracy over time 
Status of democracy           N        Mean           t          df       sig (2-tailed)           
Under SCAF’s rule                  56           6             -5.545       55             0.000     
Under Mursī’s rule          56       7.8                                       
Note: Higher scores meaning that the regime is authoritative    
According to the results presented in Table 5, the status of democracy significantly 
deteriorated during Mursī’s transition (M=7.8) compared to its counterpart during 
SCAF’s period (M=6) as perceived by Christians [Paired Samples Test (55)= -5.545, 
P=0.000] . In other words, while the Brothers thought they were driving Egypt towards 
democracy, embarking on a limited conceptualization of democracy defined by electoral 
victories, opposing factions including Copts thought that the movement was establishing 
religious autocracy. According to Nathan Brown, successive elections held at that time 
“seemed only to deepen rather than ease or resolve differences”174 between the 
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majoritarian ruling camp and the minority camp, be it political or religious. Relatedly, 
Mursī’s dictatorship was evident for example in that “the Brotherhood ran afoul of 
Egyptian moderate sensibilities by trying to establish an Islamic state” as Tarek Masoud 
has pointed out.
175
 In other words, despite the “civil state” discourse which was 
frequently advocated by the MB back then, the MB’s underlying cause was to 
establishing an Islamic state.
176
  
 
Rise of Communal Cynicism among Copts 
After assuming power, it was evident that Mursī “refused to compromise and argued that 
his electoral legitimacy gave him the right to ignore opposition demands.”177 This 
eventually created a new Islamist dictatorship as previously illustrated. Thus, a growing 
wave of communal cynicism dominated the Coptic community in particular and wider 
Egyptian society in general, especially liberals and leftists. Since the main focus of this 
part is allocated to Copts, three indicators signifying collective skepticism shared by 
Copts in particular are provided. These indicators are as follows: increasing political 
apathy; growing worries about economic situation; and rising willingness to emigrate.   
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Increasing Political Apathy  
The political apathy which dominated the Coptic community could be seen in three main 
manifestations:  perceptions of how transitions were managed; evaluations of basic 
freedoms; and interest in following political news. To start with, the management of 
transition was evaluated using a relevant question investigating attitudes towards the way 
in which political transition was handled. Responses given to answer this question varied 
from 1 (very good) to 4 (very bad). As for evaluating status of primary freedoms across 
regimes, the following question was selected: “To what extent do you think that ‘freedom 
to express opinions’ is guaranteed in your country?” Seven items covering different 
dimensions related to positioning of freedoms were directed to interviewees, with a scale 
rated from 1 (guaranteed to a great extent) to 4 (not guaranteed). These items are as 
follows: 1) Freedom to express opinions; 2) Freedom of the press; 3) Freedom to join 
political parties; 4) Freedom to participate in peaceful protests and demonstrations; 5) 
Freedom to join civil associations and organizations; 6) Freedom to sue the government 
and its agencies; and 7) Freedom to vote. After excluding item 7 since it was asked in 
wave II only, a separate aggregated scale (for each individual wave) adding up scores of 
the 6 items was created with a total points of 6 to 24. The newly created scales were 
highly reliable: Cronbach’s Alpha for the 6 items evaluating status of freedoms during 
SCAF’s transition is 0.912, whereas the Cronbach’s Alfa for the other 6 items measuring 
positioning of freedoms during Mursī’s period is 0.924. These high scores suggest that 
items of each scale have high internal consistency. The third variable addressing interests 
in following political news was measured using the following question: “To what extent 
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do you follow political news in your country?” Responses given to this item varied from 
1 (to a great extent) to 4 (I don’t follow political news at all). 
Table 6. Paired Samples Tests identifying differences in political apathy among Copts over time 
Political apathy indicators                        N     Mean           t                 df          sig (2-tailed)           
Management of transition 
Under SCAF’s rule                  61          2.6          -6.567       60             0.000     
Under Mursī’s rule          61       3.4 
Respect of basic freedoms  
Under SCAF’s rule                  50          10.5        - 3.518         49     0.001     
Under Mursī’s rule          50       14 
Following political news  
Under SCAF’s rule                  69           2.2          -2.226          68     0.02     
Under Mursī’s rule          69        2.5 
Note: Higher means refer to deterioration of the indicator at hand 
During times of political transformation newly elected regimes are expected to build 
broader coalitions and provide several compromises, which are deemed preconditions for 
a consolidated democracy to occur in the first place.
178
 As it has been indicated earlier, 
Mursī’s regime failed to establish either of these requirements. This conclusion was 
empirically proven right as the results in Table 6 point out. To start, the management of 
transition during Mursī was perceived by ordinary Copts to be statistically worse (M=3.4) 
than that of the SCAF (M=2.6) [Paired Samples Test (60)= -6.567, P=0.000]. As for 
respecting freedoms, the results demonstrate that essential freedoms deteriorated 
significantly during Mursī’s transition (M=14) compared to their counterparts during 
                                                          
178
 Zoltan Barany, “Exits from Military Rule: Lessons for Burma,” Journal of 
Democracy 26, no. 2 (2015): 96. 
69 
 
SCAF’s tenure (M=10.5) [Paired Samples Test (49)= -3.518, P=0.001] according to 
Christians’ evaluation. The final indicator reflecting increasing political apathy among 
Copts during Mursī’s tenure was observed in declining interests in following political 
news. The findings indicate that interest in following political news has significantly 
declined among ordinary Christians while the MB were in office (M=2.5) compared to 
their counterparts during SCAF’s period (M=2.2) [Paired Samples Test (68)= -2.226, 
P=0.02]. It should be noted here that rising political skepticism among Copts does not 
mean that they abandoned politics entirely. Rather it means that while they might quit 
formal political process, they embarked on “street politics” to further their interests as it 
would be discussed thoroughly in the next chapter.  
 
Growing Pessimism Concerning Economic Position   
Increasing political apathy shared by Copts during Mursī’s presidency was coupled with 
growing pessimism concerning economic-related matters. To evaluate participants’ 
assessments of the economic situation, two related questions were selected. The first 
asked the participants how they would evaluate the economic situation in Egypt, with a 
scale that varied from 1 (very good) to 4 (very bad). The second question explored 
prospects for the economic situation in the foreseeable future as perceived by Copts, with 
responses ranging from 1 (much better) to 5 (much worse).  
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Table 7. Paired Samples Tests indicating increasing pessimism regarding economic situation among Copts 
over time 
Evaluating economic situation          N       Mean            t             df         sig (2-tailed)           
Current economic situation  
Under SCAF’s rule                  69          3.1          -3.506  68             0.001    
Under Mursī’s rule          69       3.5 
Foreseeable economic situation 
Under SCAF’s rule                  66          1.8          - 9.225           65    0.000     
Under Mursī’s rule          66       3.6 
Note: Higher means refer to deterioration of the economic indicator under investigation  
According to the results presented above, Egypt’s economic situation during Mursī’s 
government was statistically worse (M=3.5) than its counterpart under SCAF’s transition 
(M=3.1) [Paired Samples Test (68)= -3.506, P=0.001]  as evaluated by Copts. Relatedly, 
Christians were skeptical of the MB’s capacity to fix the then worsening economic 
position. Specifically, during SCAF’s transition Copts were more optimistic about the 
future of Egypt’s economic situation (M=1.8) than during Mursī’s period, where levels of 
pessimism have statistically increased (M=3.6) [Paired Samples Test (65)= -9.225, 
P=0.000]. These results provide empirical evidence for what has frequently been 
emphasized in the literature concerning the MB’s incompetence, and its failure to provide 
good governance.
179
 Economic inefficiency of the MB could be attributed to the fact that 
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the Brothers have primarily been trained to become religious preachers not statesmen as 
Khalil al-Anani has rightly indicated.
180
 In his analysis of Egypt’s economic situation 
under Mursī, Hafez Ghanem pointed out that the MB lacked a “serious macroeconomic 
stabilization program.”181 The author went on identifying economic difficulties 
experienced under Mursī’s regime stating that, “the economy deteriorated gradually with 
low growth and increasing unemployment and inflation…The Egyptian people were also 
feeling the pinch in terms of higher prices and shortages of some imported necessities.”182  
 
Increasing Willingness to Emigrate  
A final indicator reflecting communal resentments dominating the Coptic community 
during Mursī’s tenure could be seen in growing readiness to emigrate. This variable was 
evaluated employing the following question: “Do you think about emigrating from your 
country?” The participants were to choose from a list including a wide array of 
sociopolitical, religious, and economic reasons. Since the main aim here is to differentiate 
between Copts who thought about emigration regardless of the reason from those who 
never thought about it, a dummy variable was created. Specifically, those who answered 
yes irrespective of the reason were given 2, whereas those who reported no were given 1.   
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Table 8. Willingness to emigrate among Copts over time 
                  During SCAF’s rule               During Mursī’s rule 
Thinking about emigration             Frequency            %              Frequency             %  
Yes      14          19.7     29               42 
No     57          80.3     40               58 
            Total     71          100                  69              100 
The results in Table 8 clearly indicate that willingness rates to emigrate have dramatically 
increased among the Coptic community during Mursī’s transition compared to their 
counterparts during the SCAF. Specifically, while only 19.7% thought about emigration 
for diverse socioeconomic and political reasons during SCAF’s transition, this percentage 
was doubled during Mursī’s presidency reaching 42%. These results provide additional 
empirical evidence signifying the general deterioration of Copts’ socioeconomic position 
during the MB’s rule. Using another statistical model, a Paired Samples Test shows that 
levels of willingness to leave the country among Copts (M=1.4) were significantly higher 
during Mursī’s era than its counterparts under SCAF’s transition (M=1.2) [Paired 
Samples Test (70)= - 3.381, P=0.001]. Evidently, these significant differences are 
deemed crucial in understanding the real threats Copts had to encounter under the MB’s 
rule.  
 
Defection from Democracy and its Impacts on Changing Balance of Power 
One of the most dangerous moment threatening newly democratic transitions occurs 
when civilians decide to defect from the democratic system, lining up with the military or 
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relying on street politics to resolve differences.
183
 In fact, this opens wide doors for  
military intervention in politics. Two main dimensions addressing the willingness to 
defect from democracy among Copts are provided. The first dimension addresses the 
likelihood of siding with the military, defined by changing levels of trust in the military 
across time. This variable was evaluated using a relevant question asking participants to 
what extent they trusted the military in the two transitions, with a scale ranging from 1 (I 
trust it to a great extent) to 4 (I absolutely do not trust it). It is worth mentioning that the 
main issue here is to make a clear distinction between those who trusted the military 
during those difficult moments irrespective of degrees of trust, and those who did not 
trust at all. Thus, a dummy variable measuring varying trust levels in military was 
constructed. Copts who did not trust military at all were coded 2, whereas Copts granting 
whatever degrees of trust to military were coded 1. The second explores the extent to 
which participants believe in democracy as a way of governing as opposed to other 
systems. This was evaluated utilizing the following phrase: “A democratic system may 
have problems, yet it is better than other systems.” Answers provided ranged from 1 
(strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). Statistically, a Chi-Square test was utilized to 
investigate the first dimension (i.e., the association between religion and trust in the 
military), while an Independent-Samples T-Test was performed to measure the second 
element (i.e., diverse levels of believe in democracy as a way of governing).  
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Religious Background and Trust in the Military  
Before heading to discuss the association between religion and trust in the military across 
different regimes, it is worth remembering that Copts and Muslims alike trusted the MB 
during the SCAF’s transition. As illustrated earlier, both whished for a brighter political 
future for all Egyptians after the military would hand over power to civilians. 
Table 9. Crosstabs between religion and trust in the military during SCAF’s transition  
                   Muslims     Copts 
Trust in the military            Frequency          %             Frequency   %  
During SCAF’s transition   
Yes     1134`    99.1      68  95.8 
No          10               0.9        3    4.2 
   X
2
(1) = 7.093 , p=008            1144  100      71   100 
The data presented in Table 9 point out that Copts were more skeptical of the military’s 
intentions during the SCAF’s transitional period than Muslims. That is, religious 
background was positively correlated with levels of trust in the military during SCAF’s 
period. Comparatively, Muslims tended to trust the military (99.1%) more than Copts 
(95.8%), whereas levels of distrust in the military among Copts (4.2%) were higher than 
that of Muslims (0.9%) [p=0.008].184   
These results can be better understood by revisiting the events that occurred on 
the ground. For example, it was clear during SCAF’s transition that an informal pact had 
been established between the MB and SCAF by which a quick transfer of power to a 
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civilian government had been reached.
185
 This was definitely against non-Islamists and 
liberals in general on one side, and it was in favor of the MB’s interests on the other 
given that they were the only organized political group at the time.
186
 Relatedly, the road 
map which was announced by SCAF foresaw elections before the writing of a new 
constitution. This trajectory, again, was favoring Islamists over other political and 
religious minorities.
187
 Moreover, the committee formed by the SCAF to amend the 1971 
constitution antagonized non-Islamists including the Christian community. According to 
Brownlee et al, this was due to the fact that the committee was headed by an Islamist 
thinker, Ṭāriq al-Bishrī. More importantly, the MB was the sole political group to have 
been represented in the committee by one of its members, Ṣubhī Ṣalīh.188 
Another discriminatory policy adopted by the SCAF was evident in that sectarian 
violence against Copts was being handled by local Islamist leaders through informal 
committees rather than by enforcement of law through the state apparatus. In her 
extensive analysis of religiously-inspired violence between February 2011 and June 
2012, Mariz Tadros has emphasized the devastating consequences of this strategy on 
social cohesion. “One of the most dramatic changes occurring after the revolution,” 
Tadros writes, “is in the shift in the management of sectarian incidents on a local level 
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from the SSI [State Security Investigations] apparatus to that of the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the Salafis.”189 If we add the “Maspero Massacre” to the aforementioned instances, 
we can better understand why levels of trust in the military differed between Copts and 
Muslims during SCAF’s transition. The atrocity of Maspero, in which 27 citizens many 
of which were Christians were killed by army soldiers, substantially undermined Coptic-
SCAF relations.
190
 Agreeing with Tarek Masoud, during SCAF’s transition “both the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the army that unseated it brooked no argument and viewed 
losers in the electoral game not as minorities to be protected but as enemies to be 
silenced.”191 
Table 10. Crosstabs between religion and trust in the military during Mursī’s transition   
                             Muslims     Copts 
Trust in the military        Frequency         %              Frequency               %  
During Mursī’s transition  
Yes         1151`    93.3      68  98.6 
No              76               6.7        1    1.4 
   X
2
(1) = 3.026, p= 0.08                       1127  100      69   100 
Despite previous grievances shared among Copts, which resulted basically from the 
“sectarian approaches” followed by the SCAF, policies adopted later by Mursī have 
radically changed the balance of power between influential groups at the time. 
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Specifically, the results in Table 10 indicate that religion and trust in the military were 
positively associated during Mursī’s transition. Although Muslims and Copts granted the 
military high levels of trust during Mursi’s tenure as indicated in Table 10, Copts tend to 
trust the military (98.6%) more than Muslims (93.3%). Relatedly, levels of distrust in the 
army among Copts were significantly lower (1.4%) than among Muslims (6.7%) 
[p=0.08].
192
  
 Taken the results in Tables 9 and 10 together, it becomes clear that the MB’s 
ascendance to power has changed the balance of power between competing factions. In 
other words, the rise of the MB led to a reconstruction of Coptic-Muslims relations on 
one side, and more importantly to the reshaping of civil-military relations on the other. 
This eventually has sustained religious cleavages in society, leading to the construction of 
a more threatened Coptic community as it has been illustrated throughout the current 
chapter.   
 
Disbelieve in Democracy   
In addition to an increasing willingness to side with the military rather than with the 
elected civilian government, growing disbelieve in democracy provides another 
manifestation reflecting high levels of willingness to defect from democracy among 
Christians.  
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Table 11. T-Test showing differences in believe in democracy between Copts and Muslims across time   
Democratic system is better than other systems      N           Mean           t            df        sig (2-tailed)           
During SCAF’s transition   
Muslims                            1144          1.9          0.010       1213            0.9    
Copts                  71          1.9  
During Mursī’s transition  
 Muslims                      949         1.8        - 5.126       1003      0.000    
Copts                   56         2.4 
Note: Higher means refer to greater amounts of disbelieve in democratic system  
The findings in Table 11 point out that Muslims and Copts alike believed at first in a 
democratic system being the most appropriate pattern of governing, despite the potential 
problems attached. Specifically, the Independent Samples T-Test showed that means of 
believe in democratic system among Copts (M=1.9) where equal to those of Muslims 
(M=1.9) during SCAF’s transition [P> 0.05]. By time, it seemed that the MB left no 
room for either religious or political minorities except for losing faith in the democratic 
system as the results in Table 11 demonstrate. To elaborate, levels of disbelieve in 
democratic system shared among Copts during Mursī’s tenure were significantly higher 
(M=2.4) than their counterparts adopted by Muslims (M=1.8) [T-Test (1003)= -5.126, P= 
0.000].     
Collectively, the three main concerns Copts encountered during Mursī’s transition 
(the construction of a new Islamist dictatorship as perceived by ordinary Copts at the 
time, growing communal apathy, and oscillation between defection from or commitment 
to democracy) have ultimately given way to the “men with guns” to intervene in Egypt’s 
politics once again. Furthermore, the policies and tactics adopted by the MB have 
significantly threatened interests of Copts, motivating them towards leaning more 
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towards military after they lost hope in the newly elected democratic regime. This was 
clearly evident when Copts actively participated in the massive protests of June 30
th
, 
calling for Egypt’s first democratically elected president to leave office. For Copts being 
ruled by an Islamist regime, democracy was no longer “the only game in town”, using the 
phrase of Linz and Stepan.
193
 Frequent shifts in attitudes and positions taken by Copts 
across times and regimes explain how they could handle growing religious fears 
dominating their community in the post-2011 era. Exploring the mechanisms by which 
perceived religious fears were translated into actual actions during Mursī’s transition in 
particular is the next chapter’s main focus.   
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CHAPTER  IV 
Mechanisms Linking Perceived Religious Threats with Christians’ Collective Action 
In chapter 3 I argue that while Copts and Muslim were full of hope that Mubarak’s 
overthrow would usher in a more religiously tolerant Egypt, the MB’s rise to power and 
the subsequent hegemony of the Islamists have been perceived by Copts as a threat to 
their religious identity. Relatedly, it was also assumed that actions and policies adopted 
by the MB helped enhance levels of political apathy among Copts. On the other hand, the 
MB’s choices increased the likelihood of defection from Egypt’s new born democracy 
among ordinary Copts, calling on the military to intervene in politics in the June 30
th
 
revolt. 
This chapter traces the mechanisms by which perceived religious threats, 
dominating the Coptic community during MB rule, were translated into collective action 
noticed in their active involvement in the June 30
th 
uprisings. That is, it explores how 
self-perceptions adopted on the individual level are linked with communal behavior 
emphasizing the roles played by religiously driven factors in provoking a certain political 
action. Broadly, this chapter hypothesizes that a “return of the sacred” was shaping 
Coptic sociopolitical behavior during Mursī’s tenure. In other words, Christians were 
mainly motivated by religious factors, such as growing religious identity-related fears and 
identification more with the in-group to which they belong, while being ruled by Mursī’s 
“Islamist” rule.  
Methodologically, the results included in this chapter are primarily based on an 
analysis of narratives from in-depth interviews with 11 ordinary Christian citizens, aged 
between 21 and 48 year in Cairo. Agreeing with Reuel Rogers “interviews are an 
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indispensable source of data on minority populations, especially in light of the fact that 
these groups are still quite underrepresented in national surveys.”194 Quantitatively, 
relevant indicators drawn from the AB dataset (waves II and III) will be utilized as well. 
Diversity of interviewees was ensured in that varying socioeconomic and cultural 
backgrounds of Egypt’s Christians were represented as much as possible.195 With regard 
to the interview process, an open-ended interview guide was designed and utilized to 
elicit narratives about the topics under investigation. The interviews, which averaged 
between 45 minutes to one hour, were conducted in Arabic.   
 
Identity Politics and Dynamics of Collective Action 
In his attempt to introduce a “fourth generation of revolutionary theory”, Jack Goldstone 
has drawn attention away from conventional structural factors towards the crucial roles 
played by “revolutionary ideologies, ethnic and religious bases for revolutionary 
mobilization, intra-elite conflicts, and the possibility of multiclass coalitions.”196 In his 
work, Goldstone has emphasized the roles of “micro processes of revolutionary 
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mobilization and leadership”197 which had been overlooked in “Third-Generation” 
traditions of collective mobilization. Building on these insights, this chapter pays more 
explicit attention to the pivotal role played by religious factors in motivating collective 
action of Christians during the MB’s transition, culminating in the June 30th 
demonstrations. Growing religious fears were translated into communal political behavior 
through an array of mechanisms as illustrated in Figure 1. The rest of this chapter will 
thoroughly discuss the association between the independent variable (i.e., threatened 
identity) and the dependent variable (i.e., collective action), elaborating on each of the 
proposed mediating mechanisms.   
Figure 1: A suggested “causal-mechanisms” model linking religious threats with collective action of Copts 
 
          
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perceptions of Religious Threats  
The qualitative analysis has revealed that Christians perceived their religious identity as 
substantially threatened during Mursī’s tenure. As indicated in chapter 3, Islamists’ 
electoral hegemony and the MB-SCAF informal pact in addition to growing sectarian 
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violence against Copts have altogether maintained fears among Copts. Increasing worries 
among Copts were evident once Mursī was officially announced Egypt’s president, 
according to interviewees’ narratives. For instance, while describing her feelings after 
knowing about Mursī’s victory, Samya198 (an Orthodox female, 48-year-old) indicated 
that “we Copts were extremely terrified once we heard about Mursī’s victory…I 
remember the first Friday’s religious ceremony I attended at the church after Mursī was 
elected president…I would claim that almost all of attendees were crying, and the priest 
kept repeating that this is God’s will and that all we have is to seek His help in such 
difficult times… it was a difficult day and I felt that God left us at sea.” 
Several reasons were put forward by the participants explaining these religious 
identity-related concerns. For example, Salwa (a Protestant female, 28-year-old) 
emphasized the Muslim Brotherhood’s terrifying history with non-Muslims in general 
stating that “my religious identity was under genuine threat during the Islamist rule… 
this was due to the fact that the MB does have a black history when it comes to politics 
…more importantly, they have been intolerant towards non-Muslims in general…my 
religious fears were doubled since I was deemed a minority within a minority being 
Protestant…generally speaking, anyone who disagrees with  the MB is considered an 
enemy, let alone Copts who have been deemed by their top officials as infidels.”    
Adding another reason, Ramy (an Orthodox male, 48-year-old) pointed out that 
“the MB’s ascendance to power meant that religious discrimination against Copts would 
definitely be increasing…this is simply due to the fact that the MB has always considered 
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us as merely guests staying in an Islamic country, not as genuine citizens sharing equal 
rights and duties like Muslim citizens.” In her turn, Heba (a Protestant female, 23-year-
old) explained how the MB’s enduring grievances have been translated into negative 
positions adopted towards Christians and their interests. She said that “it was clear that 
the Muslim Brothers were hungry for power … as if they were trying to compensate the 
long history of oppression they have experienced by suppressing others, especially 
marginalized groups like us.” For more elaboration, Heba gave the following revealing 
example: “I still remember a TV talk show in which an intellectual Copt was asking one 
of the MB politicians ‘do you love us?’… the latter kept answering ‘I just respect you’… 
this was the case before they seized actual power… we were expecting the worst once 
they would officially rule Egypt.” 
These frightened narratives can be understood in terms of the Islamization wave 
dominating Egypt’s public sphere since the eruption of the Arab Spring, culminating 
during the Islamist rule that followed. Drawing on the AB (waves III), several 
quantitative indicators signifying this Islamization of society can be introduced.  
Table 12. Muslims’ attitudes toward enacting country’s laws in accordance with Islamic law during  
    Mursi’s transition  
 
The government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with Islamic law  
                                                 Frequency                 %  
I strongly agree        305  28.5  
I somewhat agree       525                  49  
I disagree        171   16 
      I strongly disagree        70     6.5  
Total                                         1071  100 
To begin with, the results (Table 12) indicate that the vast majority of Egypt’s Muslim 
citizens (77.5%) agreed during Mursī’s presidency (to a great and a medium extent, 
combined) that the country’s laws should be enacted in accordance with Islamic law 
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Table13. Muslims’ attitudes toward applying sharī‘a more strictly during Mursī’s transition     
                                                             Frequency                      %  
I strongly support           335       33.3 
I somewhat support            474           44.4  
I do not support               196       18.4 
I strongly do not support             42       3.9  
Total                   1067            100    
It was not only the case that Muslim citizens favored enactment of local laws so that it 
matches with Islamic sharī‘a laws, but it was also clear that a considerable amount of 
them called for applying sharī‘a more strictly. Table 13 indicates that 77.7% of Muslims 
supported (to a great and a medium extent, combined) a more strict application of sharī‘a 
during Mursī’s reign in particular,199 compared to 22.3% who rejected this idea 
(combining both who do not support and strongly do not support together).  
Table14. Preferring a religious political party over a non-religious political party among Muslims during 
Mursī’s tenure 
The first sentence: prefer a religious political party over a non-religious political party 
The second sentence: prefer a non-religious political party over a religious political party 
                              Frequency        %        
I strongly agree with the 1
st
 sentence     230    22.1     
I agree with the 1
st
 sentence        190              18.2   
I agree with the 2
nd
 sentence       290           27.8   
I strongly agree with the 2
nd
 sentence    124                 11.9 
I don’t agree with either sentence    208    20 
Total                        1042    100  
Another facet reflecting the extent to which Egypt’s political sphere was Islamized could 
also be found in the positions adopted by the participants towards religious political 
parties, and the role they were expected to play in post-2011 era. Empirically, during the 
MB transition, 40.3% of Muslims supported (to a great and a medium extent, combined) 
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religious political parties over non-religious ones, compared to 39.7% who preferred (to a 
great or a medium extent, combined) political parties over religious ones. These results 
interpret why Islamists captured almost 70% of the parliamentary seats in Egypt’s 
founding election that took place right after the 2011 revolution. Seemingly, benefiting 
from the Islamization process that swept across Egypt at the time, the Freedom and 
Justice Party won 41.9% of the seats. Relatedly, the Salafist bloc which was led by al-Nur 
Party seized 24.2% of the vote and al-Wasat Party captured 2% of the seats.
200
 
Shockingly, the liberal-oriented Wafd Party, which had been a key player in Egypt’s 
political scene even before the 1952 revolution, was defeated by newly formed Islamist 
parties. Arguably, this defeat can also be deemed another manifestation reflecting the 
Islamization of society.   
 
Mechanisms Connecting Identity with Collective Action: The Individual Level 
The qualitative analysis indicated that two main “micro processes” helped mobilize 
individual Copts against Mursī and the Brothers: growing perceptions of personal 
insecurity and increasing feelings of unequal citizenship.  
Personal Insecurity 
The thematic analysis has clearly showed that Copts were substantially lacking personal 
as well as family safety during the MB rule. Feelings of insecurity were evident across 
denomination, age, and gender. For instance, Lydia (an Orthodox female, 24-year-old) 
pointed out that “one of the main reasons which made me so scared, personally speaking, 
was that ordinary citizens were encouraged to attack assets and holy places of Copts 
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empowered by the fact that Egypt was ruled by an Islamist president…I was shocked to 
find some of my colleagues in university, whom I later discovered that they belong to the 
MB, starting to treat their opponents very badly.” In her turn, Salwa showed how 
sectarian violence against Copts was informally resolved through reconciliation meetings 
rather than by implementing laws. “You cannot imagine,” Salwa elaborates, “how scared 
I was when knowing about these reconciliation committees in which Copts, whose social 
and religious fundamental rights were significantly violated, were forced to make certain 
concessions with culprits or otherwise their personal safety would be further 
jeopardized.” 
Furthermore, Ramy focused on how the discourse of hatred advocated by the MB 
and Salafis against Copts was threating his personal security. He pointed out that “the 
Muslim Brothers used to ignore our existence to begin with… look for example at the 
Islamic discourse they were disseminating and you will find that demands such as the 
enforcement of jizya on Copts and the exclusive slogan of Islamiyya Islamiyya were 
prevalent…I felt that my personal as well as family safety were under real threat out of 
such scary thoughts.”    
Table 15. Perceived personal and family’s insecurity among Copts across transitions   
Do you currently feel that your own personal as well as your family’s safety and security are ensured or not 
                    During SCAF       During Mursī  
                                     Frequency             %           Frequency                 %  
Fully ensured      9  12.7      3    4.5  
Ensured       20       28.2    8                   12.2  
Not ensured      28      39.4   36   54.5 
     Absolutely not ensured     14               19.7  19   28.8  
Total                           71   100  66  100 
These fearful narratives were empirically supported as Table 15 illustrates. Specifically, 
while 41% of Copts felt that their personal and family’s security were ensured (to a great 
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or a medium extent, combined) during SCAF’s transition, this percentage has 
dramatically declined under Mursī’s regime in that only 16.6% whose personal security 
was ensured (after adding “Fully ensured” and “Ensured” together). Relatedly, Christians 
who developed a common sense of insecurity (to a great and a medium extent, combined) 
jumped from 59% under the SCAF to 83.3% under Mursī’s regime. To make sure, a 
Paired Sample Test demonstrated that Copts’ feelings of unsafety during Mursī’s reign 
(M=3.08) were significantly higher
201
 than under SCAF’s transition a year earlier 
(M=2.67) [Paired Samples Test (65)= -2.628, P= 0.01]. 
Table16. Comparing personal and family’s insecurity status across different regimes      
 Compared to this time last year, do you feel that your own personal and your family’s safety and security 
are now?             Frequency                     %  
Better than last year             4       6 
Same as last year           25         37.3 
Worse than last year            38     56.7     
Total        67          100    
The findings outlined in Table 16 further confirm the growing insecurity feelings 
previously mentioned, where 56.7% of the participants stated that their personal and 
family’s security during Mursī’s tenure were worse than during SCAF’s period. 
Relatedly, only 6% who indicated that their personal safety was in a better situation 
during Mursī’s tenure than that had been experienced under the SCAF.   
 
 
 
                                                          
201
 Higher scores referring to greater perceptions of insecurity, since that “Fully 
ensured” was coded 1 while “Absolutely not ensured” was coded 4 in the AB’s original 
survey.  
89 
 
Unequal Citizenship 
While explaining the deep-root causes triggering sectarian violence in Egypt, Saif ‘Abd 
al-Fattāh emphasized the issue of equal citizenship as being a main catalyst in this regard. 
The author conceived equal citizenship as being an ideological, institutional, and 
practical framework, which can enhance or undermine sectarian tensions between 
Muslims and Copts.
202
 In other words, he shed light on the theoretical and practical 
dimensions constituting the real meaning of equal citizenship. Empirically, neither of the 
two aspects was maintained during Mursī’s presidency in particular according to the 
qualitative results.  
For example, Peter (an Orthodox male, 32-year-old) showed how the essence of 
equality was demolished due to the phenomenon of bearded policemen which grew 
steadily after Islamists came to power. Commenting on these unprecedented scenes, Peter 
said that: “we Copts have always been dealt with as second-rank citizens regardless of 
the regime… yet, I really was so terrified watching Egyptian police officers with a 
beard… this matter was further threatening equality… simply because I was completely 
sure that any problem between me and Muslim would become a supreme state security 
case, meaning that my rights, if any, would be undermined since a ‘bearded’ policeman 
would never treat an ‘infidel Copt’ like me equally as he would do with his Muslim 
brethren.” 
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Inequality between Muslims and Copts can be seen on both societal and institutional 
levels as the interviewees indicated. As for the former, Salwa focused on discriminatory 
policies seen in private businesses stating that “I would argue that Copts are not treated 
equally with Muslim citizens…this is clearly evident in the private sector for instance 
…where it is so common to find advertisements placed on the clothing stores’ door or 
even in streets looking for veiled girls only to hire…this phenomenon increased 
dramatically after the Islamists’ rise to power.” Providing another manifestation showing 
society-based inequality, Salwa moved on adding that “regarding the MB period in 
particular, take Friday’s ceremonies as another example of social inequality…believe me 
or not, almost every Friday I used to listen to hateful Islamic discourse describing Copts 
and Jews as being the descendants of monkeys and pigs, infidels, and apostates and so 
forth…I cannot imagine what would happen to Copts if any preacher had used such 
words in describing Muslims?!...how could anyone claim then that Muslims and Copts 
are equal?…it is just nonsense. 
Concerning institutional inequality, Samya emphasized how Copts have usually 
been prohibited from occupying high-rank posts in government especially in the military 
and police establishments. She made this point clear saying that “inequality can be easily 
seen in the military and the police where you will never find Copts in higher positions… 
it would be great if you find one among 1000 accepted students in the police academy, 
for instance, who is a Copt…while this discriminatory policy has been evident across 
different regimes, it was further maintained during Mursī’s presidency for sure.”  
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Table 17. Perceptions of unequal citizenship among Copts across transitions      
To what extent do you fell that you are being treated equally compared to other citizens in your country? 
                    During SCAF       During Mursī  
                                     Frequency              %           Frequency                 %  
To a great extent    16  22.5    4  6.3  
To a medium extent    26       36.6  19                   29.7  
To a limited extent     15      21.2   26   40.6 
     Not at all      14               19.7  15   23.4  
Total                           71   100  64  100 
Table 17 provides empirical evidence for the unequal citizenship themes previously 
outlined. In detail, whereas 59% of Christians reported that they were treated equally (to 
a great or a medium extent, combined) with other citizens during SCAF’s period, this 
percentage deteriorated considerably during Mursī’s tenure reaching 36% (after adding 
“to a great extent” and “to a medium extent” together). As for perceived unequal 
treatment, the results revealed that while 41% of Copts think that they were not receiving 
equal treatment (to a limited extent and not at all, together) like other citizens during 
SCAF’s time, the proportion of perceived unequal treatment rose during Mursī’s reign to 
64% (to a limited extent and not at all, combined). To make sure whether the change in 
these figures is statistically significant or not, Paired Sample Tests were performed. The 
results indicated that Coptic perceptions of lacking social equality during Mursī’s 
presidency (M=2.8) were significantly higher
203
 than their equivalents which had been 
practiced during SCAF’s transition (M=2.3) [Paired Samples Test (63)= -2.894, 
P=0.005]. 
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Mechanisms Connecting Identity with Collective Action: The Community Level  
Collective Identification 
Agreeing with David Zeidan, “Copts are committed to preserving their identity against 
the assimilative majority… history has taught them to stick together and compete for 
survival.”204 While this has been the rule during normal times, Copts’ commitment to 
survive reached a peak during the wave of Islamization following the Arab Spring. As 
will be elaborated in this section, collective identification tendencies among Christians 
have significantly increased during Mursī’s tenure. In other words, individual’s 
grievances indicated above (i.e., lack of both personal insecurity and inequality) were 
transformed into collective action through a group identification mechanism. Collective 
identification with the Coptic community, in turn, could be noticed primarily in two main 
manifestations as the qualitative analysis has revealed: increase of social bonds among 
Christians and rise of church going. 
Growing Social Ties  
As for social bonds, interviewees pointed out that mutual interactions and ties among 
Christians have increased during Mursī’s transition in particular. For instance, Heba 
highlighted the issue of Copts’ social solidarity stating that: “I remember that we 
Christians got closer to each other since the rise of Islamists to power, especially during 
these days in which Islamists were organizing and leading the demonstrations… at that 
time, we used to invite our friends and relatives whose homes are located near these 
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protests to come and stay with us in our home until these demonstrations are over … this 
was also happening the other way around… something made us more secure.”  
Another facet reflecting this pattern of social cohesion was seen in the growing 
reliance on Christian media outlets for collecting news and information about Copts. 
Elaborating more on this point, Peter stated that “I tend to rely on public TV channels in 
gaining news more than on Coptic media platforms…however, during the MB rule I was 
heavily relying on Coptic religious media such as SAT 7, al-Haq wa al-Ḍalāl [the Right 
and Wrong] and al-Tariq [the Road] since these platforms were providing more profound 
details about sectarian violence targeting Copts and churches.” 
An additional manifestation signifying growing collective identification processes 
was witnessed in collective prayers Christians used to conduct, irrespective of their 
religious diversity. Highlighting these aggregated religious services, Maha (a Protestant 
girl, 21-year-old) pointed out that “in general, whenever we face any sort of crises we ask 
God’s help…what was new after Islamists took power was that diverse Christian 
denominations used to gather together in the nearest church regardless of religious 
affiliation for congregational prayers…these unified prayers were for Egypt to overcome 
that hard time.”     
Increasing Communal Religious Piety 
Another agreement was found among participants that religious piety among Christians 
rose substantially during the Islamists’ reign. Mona (a Protestant girl, 23-year-old), for 
instance, noted that “during the MB rule it was unprecedented that prayers were 
conducted in rotating shifts…I would argue that the only benefit we gained out of the 
Islamists’ ascendance to power was that we Copts became more attached to our God.” 
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Relatedly, church going increased fundamentally at that time as the participants have 
indicated. “Before the 25 revolution,” Peter stated, “I used to go to church monthly, 
however, I started to go on a weekly basis during the MB ruls…being in church during 
those hard times made me feel secure.” 
Quantitatively, the results presented in Table 18 support the narrative outlined 
above in that the overwhelming majority of Christians used to attend Sunday’s services 
since the Islamization wave following Mubarak’s overthrow. It should be noted, 
however, that Egyptians have always been known to be religiously committed persons 
whether they are Muslims or Copts. As Mohammed Nossier has put it, “[a]helicopter 
view of our society would certainly show that Egyptians are apparently strongly attached 
to their religions.”205 “Over the last few decades,” the author elaborates, “both Muslims 
and Christians tend to pray considerably more often and attend religion classes more 
frequently.”206 
Table 18. Patterns of church going across regimes       
Do you attend Sunday services? 
                    During SCAF       During Mursī  
                                     Frequency              %           Frequency                 %  
Always     42  59.1    34  51.5  
Most of the time     15       21.1  18                   27.3  
Sometimes         8      11.3     8   12.2 
      Rarely          6                  8.5    6     9  
Total                           71   100  66  100 
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Nevertheless, it was expected that increasing hostile sectarian attacks targeting Christians 
and their holy places, which rose drastically since the 2011 uprising (see chapter 2), 
would help decline levels of church going. The findings in Table 18 challenge this 
expectation, since that 91.5% and 91% of Christians kept attending Sunday’s ceremonies 
(with varying degrees) either during SCAF’s or Mursī’s tenure (respectively) despite the 
high degrees of personal risks associated.    
These results can be understood in terms of the recent body of literature which has 
emphasized the relationship between religion and/or religious establishments and 
collective action of minority groups.
207
 Two main premises were introduced in this 
regard. First, religion can enhance political activism through “institutional effects”, in 
which religious leaders directly encourage attendees to get involved in political events.
208
 
Based on this type of understanding, religious institutions are deemed key “catalyst for 
mobilization” since they provide essential organizational resources advancing collective 
mobilization such as social interactions and communication connections.
209
 The second 
argument centers around the idea that religion can sustain political engagement through 
attitudinal/psychological impacts. Such emotional effects touch, for example, on the role 
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played by religious institutions in preserving a common sense of belonging among the 
believers. Also, they can enhance interests in politics among attendees on one hand, and 
empower them with crucial knowledge about political issues on the other.
210
  
The qualitative analysis revealed that both organizational and attitudinal effects 
attached to religion have enhanced collective identification processes among Christians, 
which eventually were translated to communal action seen in the June 30th revolt. 
Tapping on the organizational resources provided by the church, Mona clarified that “we 
used to go to church in groups…communal prayers made us stronger and more secure… 
and in case we die, for any reasons, we would die together inside our church.” Agreeing, 
Salwa said that “being in church gave me an unprecedented chance to socialize with 
other fellow Christians…I used to go to church even during Mondays…being there 
helped me alleviate increasing fears and tensions of the time.” 
As for the emotional dimension, almost all interviewees confirmed that priests 
and other religious clergy were strongly motivating them to get involved in the political 
events and not to miss any opportunity to participate in public affairs. For example, 
Samya stated that “while it never happened that we were guided by church leaders to 
elect a certain presidential or parliamentary candidate, we were often urged to 
participate actively in all election contests.” Furthermore, Ramy pointed out that “church 
going at that time helped maintain Copts’ religious spirituality which in turn assisted in 
overcoming growing anxieties dominating the Coptic community back then.” Along the 
same lines, Lydia indicated that “the church was strongly urging us to fast and pray more 
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than normal not only for the sake of Copts but also for Egyptian society as a whole… this 
helped me a lot to manage my feelings of insecurity.”  
 
Group Consciousness  
Despites the key role it plays in sustaining a sense of belonging among the members of 
marginalized groups, collective identification cannot incite social mobilization on its 
own. According to Allison Calhoun-Brown, “group membership or mere group 
identification, however, is not enough to affect political participation. It is group 
consciousness that affects political participation.”211 Thus, a distinction is made between 
group membership (i.e., collective identification process) and group consciousness as 
Arthur Miller and his colleagues have pointed out.
212
 The authors elaborated that while 
the former “connotes a perceived self-location within a particular social stratum”, the 
latter “involves identification with a group and [Italics in original] a political awareness 
or ideology regarding the group’s relative position in society.”213 Another differential 
element lies in the fact that group consciousness is conceived as a more politicized 
concept than group identification. This is because group awareness involves a perception 
of deprivation, which a certain subordinate group might experience when it is compared 
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with dominant groups.
214
 Accordingly, the main hypothesis provided here is that “group 
identification will translate into group consciousness … and [then] political action will 
result.”215 In other words, group consciousness is considered an inevitable mechanism 
which helps transform collective identification into communal political activism.     
This type of reasoning was proven correct in the current work. The quantitative 
findings revealed that interviewees did conceive of the religious group to which they 
belong (i.e., the Christian community) as being fundamentally deprived of basic religious 
rights compared to the rights enjoyed by the dominant out-group (i.e., the Muslim 
community). To be sure, the victimized consciousness adopted by Copts has been evident 
across times and regimes, yet it increased drastically under the MB’s Islamist rule. For 
instance, Samy emphasized collective grievances shared by the Coptic community during 
Mursī’s tenure. He stated that, “I wanted to get rid of Mursī and the Islamist group 
backing him even if the military would return to politics…believe me, the main goal of the 
Muslim Brothers was to humiliate the entire Coptic society, placing them underneath 
their shoes.” In her turn, Heba reported that her religious identity was more salient during 
the Islamist’s reign than her national identity. She went on pointing out that, “during the 
Islamist period I felt that my religious identity was more present than my nationality… 
this could be attributed to that the MB wanted us to leave the country… thus, it was not 
the case that my national identity which was threatened, rather it was my religious 
affiliation.” Following, Gamal (an Orthodox male, 31-year-old) indicated that “several 
Copts did not dare even to go out of their home while the MB was in office…we Copts 
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will never forget the horrible scenes in which several churches were being exploded and 
burnt down in front of our eyes on TV channels.” 
It is worth mentioning that Copts’ group consciousness was not occurring in a 
vacuum. Rather, certain leverages were employed in this regard among which was 
historical memory. In other words, a present and vibrant memorization of previous 
sectarian attacks targeting Copts helped Christians’ religious identity to be maintained. 
According to Baljinder Sahdra and Michael Ross, recalling hostile and tragic incidents 
committed against in-group members enhances the social identity of the in-group.
216
 
Analyzing the main themes expressed by interviewees has demonstrated that almost all 
participants had a strong memorization of previous hostile incidents in which members of 
the in-group and/or holy places of worshiping were targeted. Yasser (an Orthodox male, 
32-year-old), for instance, provided a detailed list of several sectarian assaults targeting 
Copts. This list varied to include sectarian instances starting from al-Zawyia al-Hamra in 
1981, then recalling al-Kush’h incident of 1999, ending with recent accelerated church 
burnings witnessed after Mursī’s overthrow in 2013. Other participants (e.g., Samya and 
Salwa) provided exact numbers and locations of churches that have been attacked during 
the Islamist’s period. Other interviewees (e.g., Ramy and Peter) gave specific names of 
the Brothers and Salafis who were advocating hatred discourse against Christians at that 
time. Taken together, collective identification and group consciousness have helped 
transform Coptic grievances into real communal action observed in June 30
th
 massive 
protests.    
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Collective Action  
 As thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2, the Muslim Brotherhood came to power prepared 
with a fully developed strategy that would help “transform Egypt into a kind of 
missionary state”, using Shadi Hamid’s expression. 217 In response, a counter strategy of 
“return of the sacred” was primarily constructing attitudes and behavior of Christians 
throughout the “Islamist” rule. In other words, growing collective political activism 
observed in June 30 demonstrations (i.e., the main dependent variable in this work) can 
be explained mainly by the increasing identity threats perceived by Copts (i.e., the main 
independent variable in study) at the time. This argument has strongly been supported 
throughout this chapter, utilizing several quantitative as well as qualitative indicators.  
The literature on causes and dynamics of protest participation has emphasized the 
role played by relative deprivation in inciting collective action, especially among 
minority groups.
218
 A distinction was made in this respect between two different types of 
deprivation: individual deprivation and group deprivation. While the former occurs when 
individuals compare their social situations with other individuals’ respective positions, 
the latter happens when comparisons are made among social groups.
219
 Empirically, the 
two types of deprivation were evident in this work as the qualitative analysis has 
revealed.  
                                                          
217
 Shadi Hamid, “The End of the End of History,” Foreign Policy, November 15, 
2016, para 8, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/15/the-end-of-the-end-of-history/  
 
218
 Bert Klandermans, Jojanneke van der Toorn, and Jacquelien van Stekelenburg, 
“Embeddedness and Identity: How Immigrants Turn Grievances into Action,” American 
Sociological Review 73, no. 6 (2008): 994. 
 
219
 Ibid. 
101 
 
To be sure, participants felt that Copts at both the individual and communal levels were 
deprived of a secure religious identity and of religious freedom during the Islamists’ 
reign. These growing feelings of deprivation have resulted in politicizing Copts’ religious 
identity, inciting a wave of collective “street politics” seen in June 30 protests.  
To start with, it can be argued that while ordinary Copts have held certain 
attitudes towards sociopolitical concerns facing Egyptian society in general, they used not 
to engage in massive demonstrations advancing these issues. This paradoxical behavior, 
which can be attributed to a wide array of sociopolitical and religious considerations (see 
chapter 2) was typically evident throughout the period preceded the 2011 era. This 
conclusion was supported qualitatively and quantitatively. As for the former, while 
almost all interviewees (nine out of eleven) expressed hostile narratives about Mubarak 
and his long established rule, only a few of them (four out of eleven) participated in the 
18-day of the 2011 revolution.  
Table 19. Copts’ engagement in politics during the 2011revolution220      
                                                                                   Frequency                    %  
During the 2011 revolution was your position closer to (N=58) 
Supporters of Mubarak                    15         26  
Opposition against Mubarak                                        43         74 
Actual participation in the 2011 revolution (N=71)       
 Yes                        4             5.6   
       No                    67                     94.4  
Quantitatively, the findings represented in Table 19 show that while 74% of Copts 
adopted negative positions towards Mubarak, only 5.6% of them who translated these 
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verbal stances into reality by engaging in the 18-day protests against him. Broadly, these 
patterns of political inactiveness had been shaping behavior of Copts since at least 
Nasser’s era.221 However, these patterns were changed drastically after the Islamists took 
power in that ordinary Christian citizens got involved enthusiastically in the protests of 
June 30. This conclusion was strongly supported through the thematic analysis as well.
222
 
Empirically, the majority of interviewees
223
 reported that they had taken to the streets and 
public squares of Egypt protesting against both Mursī and the Brothers. When asked 
about key factors that were driving them towards collective participation in the massive 
demonstrations back then, the interviewees introduced a diverse array of reasons. While 
some participants (e.g., Gamal and Salwa) tapped in the deteriorating socioeconomic 
situation in Egypt at the time, others (e.g., Samy and Peter) focused on the fact that 
neither Mursī nor the MB as a whole was deemed politically competent to proceed in 
office.   
In addition to the economic and political factors, the most emphasized reason that 
was motivating the interviewees towards collective mobilization revolved around 
insecure religious identity, however. To elaborate, Peter for instance pointed out that “I 
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participated in the June 30 protests from the first hour…since we Copts in particular had 
nothing to lose…it was evident that the MB was heading towards recreation of the 
Islamic caliphate…if this happened we Copts would’ve witnessed a new Era of Martyrs 
…and we would’ve been forced to choose among the following three options: converting 
to Islam; paying Jizya; being dismissed out of country.” In her turn, Mona indicated that 
“I participated in June 30 demonstration from the first moment…this is due to the fact 
that throughout Mursī’s year in office Copts’ general position was deteriorating…in 
addition, the Muslim Brothers do not recognize that we Copts exist in the first place.” By 
the same token, Ramy commented that: “I participated in the June 30 uprisings because 
I did not want the MB gang to continue to rule the country… really I felt at the time that 
it was not only the case that Coptic identity was under existential threat but also the 
wider Egyptian identity…it was so clear that the MB’s prime goal was to reestablish the 
Islamic caliphate at the expense of Egypt’s interests…let alone the interests of 
marginalized group such as Copts.” 
Taken together, the qualitative and quantitative indicators outlined throughout this 
chapter have strongly supported the main premise provided. Specifically, perceived 
identity threat was deemed the key explanatory factor by which Christians’ collective 
mobilization witnessed in the June 30 protests can be understood. That is, the results 
emphasized the crucial role played by identity politics in motivating collective action of 
Copts. As Bert Klandermans has put it, “identity politics makes collective identities 
salient, contributes to their politicization and radicalization, and triggers political 
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protest.”224 As for the current work, it has been evident that “identity politics” has helped 
politicize Christians’ communal identities. This was mainly due to the fact they were 
being ruled for the first time in their modern history by a purely “Islamist” rule (i.e., the 
Muslim Brotherhood). The association between religious identity and collective action of 
Copts was mediated by certain mechanisms. While some of these dynamics were 
occurring at the individual level (i.e., lack of both personal security and social equality), 
others were happening at the group level (i.e., collective identification and group 
consciousness) as the current chapter has indicated.    
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CONCLUSION  
Religious Identity and Dynamics of Resistance in Times of Transition  
Identity as a Form of Resistance  
According to Bert Klandermans, “politics is about distribution of goods and bads in 
society.”225 A profound examination of the socio-political and religious grievances (i.e., 
“the bads”) perceived by Egyptians due to the 2011 revolution and the subsequent  
Muslim Brotherhood’s ascendance to power reveals that they were not distributed equally 
among Muslims and Copts. To elaborate, it has been evident throughout this thesis that 
Egypt’s Christian citizens considered the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule as a genuine threat 
to their collective identity compared to Muslim citizens. Furthermore, Copts felt at that 
time that that they were being “relatively deprived” of fundamental religious as well as 
sociopolitical rights. Moreover, feelings of insecurity experienced by the Coptic 
community either at personal or collective level reached a climax due to the rise of 
sectarian violence targeting Copts and their religious buildings during the Islamist reign.   
While processes of social exclusion/inclusion in Egypt are primarily established 
on religious identities during normal times as Elizabeth Iskander has argued,
226
 patterns 
of exclusion/inclusion were further accelerated since the 2011 revolution culminating 
during the Brotherhood’s rule. As illustrated earlier in this work (chapter 2), the Muslim 
Brothers came to Egypt’s power with a full-blown conceptualization regarding the state 
and the role of the sharī‘a in society. Regarding the former, Muslim Brotherhood 
theorists have advocated for non-nation state models, such as the Islamic 
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Caliphate/Umma, rather than nation-state entities distinguishing the modern era. In other 
words, Islamists have revolved around religious faith rather than political borders and 
geographical boundaries in theorizing the state as a political body. Concerning the 
sharī‘a, it has been elaborated that the establishment of an Islamic state and society based 
entirely on sharī‘at Allah has been the primary goal not only for the Brothers but for all 
fellow Islamist movements.   
 The Islamists’ entrenchment with such type of thinking, through which the whole 
society would be Islamized, has sustained fears and uncertainties among members of the 
Christian community in particular. This is simply due to the fact that calling for the 
restoration of the Islamic caliphate on the one side, and the enforcement of sharī‘a on the 
other, means nothing but worsening the already deteriorated sociopolitical positions of 
Copts. Thus, the rise of Islamists to power yielded corresponding patterns of religious 
attachments among ordinary Copts as previously outlined (chapter 2). Understandably, 
identity politics was hence deemed the main leverage utilized by ordinary Christians in 
resisting what was perceived a “hostile” political regime (i.e., the MB rule) back then.  
 While examining the influence of identity on motivating collective activism, Bert 
Klandermans emphasized two main aspects constructing identity: a “we” and a “they.” 
The author moved on pointing out that “we” is “a definition of the group or collective 
treated unjustly,”227 whereas “they” is “a definition of some institution or authority that is 
responsible for the injustice.”228 The findings in this work have supported this type of 
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reasoning. More specifically, conservative theorizations that had been advocated by the 
Brothers against Christians in addition to the increasing sectarian actions targeting Copts 
once they assumed power have produced a “we” versus a “they” feeling229 among Copts 
(see chapter 4). These “affective” social categorizations generated certain “behavioral” 
consequences reflected in growing involvements in June 30 uprisings among Christians, 
which in turn supports the social identity tradition (review Theoretical Framework, 
chapter 1).  
In fact, feelings of injustice was not the sole factor that helped sustain a “we” 
versus “they” thinking as suggested by Klandermans, when it comes to analyzing general 
positions of Copts under the MB rule. In other words, perceived injustice and considering 
the MB rule as being incompetent were complementing each other, accelerating social 
classification processes among the Coptic community. Jack Goldstone was crucial in 
pointing out that “[t]he joint need to manage state tasks and cultural standing can be 
summed up in two words: effectiveness and justice.”230 Goldstone moved on elaborating 
that rulers may be forgiven if perceived by citizens as unjust but efficient or as 
incompetent but just, whereas they will not be tolerated if deemed both unjust and 
incompetent.
231
 To be sure, the relationship between Copts and the Brothers provides a 
clear example in support of Goldstone’s hypothesis. Broadly, ordinary Copts considered 
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the MB rule as being both incompetent and unjust. Specifically, the quantitative and 
qualitative findings have indicated that Copts lacked feelings of equal citizenship and 
personal security due to these types of policies as well as strategies adopted by the MB. 
In addition, they perceived Mursī’s government as inefficient economically as well as 
politically (see chapters 3 and 4).  As a result, ordinary Copts reorganized themselves 
around the church’s leadership and the religious group to which they belonged in pursuit 
of justice and efficiency they lacked under the MB reign.  
Revolving around one’s own group assists in the construction of what Goldstone 
labeled “protest identities” among the entire group’s members, which is basically 
reinforced through three main resources according to the author:  
First, the group helps to justify and validate the individual’s grievances and anger 
against the status quo. Second, the group…gives a sense of empowerment, 
autonomy and efficacy to its members…Third, the state itself may create or 
reinforce a sense of oppositional identity by labeling a group as its enemies or by 
acting against the group, thus demonstrating that the group is now outside the 
protection and justice of the state.
232
     
Applying this type of reasoning was proven correct in the current project. Specifically, 
the first resource was manifested in that church going empowered Copts with essential 
institutional context needed to share perceived or real grievances and worries with the in-
group members (organizational effects). As for the second resource, the interviewees 
pointed out that while in church they were strongly encouraged to participate in politics 
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either by church leaderships or other fellow Copts (attitudinal resources). Concerning the 
roles played by Mursī’s regime itself in sustaining protest identities among Christians, the 
interviewees emphasized that Islamists in general have always considered Christians as 
being infidels and/or enemies. Thus, they felt that they were not given equal rights to that 
of Muslim citizens based on religious claims advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
theorists even before they seized actual power. Relatedly, the participants felt that they 
were outside the protection of the Islamist state. This was manifested, for example, in the 
informal committees in which religious grievances of Copts were resolved by local 
agents rather than by the enforcement of state laws. This phenomenon was established 
during the SCAF transition and furthered during the MB rule as the thematic analysis 
revealed (chapter 4).     
 
Identity and Strategies for Survival  
The previous discussion supports the social identity and collective mobilization 
traditions, which have emphasized the fact that identities are social constructions. That is, 
they are constructed and reconstructed by several forces, including cultural discourses, 
social conflicts, and shifts in power relations of key social forces and groups in society.
233
 
Accordingly, it should not come as a surprise that a “threatened Coptic identity” was 
produced because of the growing fears resulting from the rise of Islamists to power as 
this work has elaborated. In addition, these frightened identities were ultimately 
reconstructed yielding “protest identities” among Copts as outlined above. Drawing on 
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the process-based nature of identity, this section emphasizes two main identity-related 
survival strategies which were utilized by Copts during the Islamist’s reign: social 
mobility and social change.   
 
Social Mobility 
According to the social identity tradition, individuals whose own groups are socially 
deemed in a lower status tend to leave or detach themselves from perceived disadvantage 
groups, moving upward towards more valued groups.
234
 Understandably, this 
psychological mechanism, which occurs mainly on the individual level, is expected to 
accelerate during times of social unrest. Based on the results of the current work, Egypt’s 
Christian citizens have historically considered themselves as belonging to a less desirable 
social group due to their religious affiliation. Relatedly, deep-rooted feelings of 
inferiority shared among Copts have flourished during the rule of Islamists as the 
thematic analysis has revealed (chapter 4). Two main plausible dimensions measuring 
whether or not ordinary Copts embarked on an individual mobility strategy during the 
MB rule were examined: converting to Islam and migration.  
 Qualitatively, the findings have shown that converting to Islam was never thought 
of among interviewees as being an instrument for managing growing religious fears and 
subordination perceived during the MB rule. However, the results pointed out that most 
of them thought about fleeing the country back then. As for conversion, Mona for 
example stated that “I can accept the idea that someone chooses to convert to Islam as 
long as he/she is totally convinced…but I can never agree with those who change their 
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religion out of fears whatsoever…although I was extremely frightened during the Islamist 
rule I never thought of conversion.” Following, Maha was assertive regarding this issue 
saying that “If I was to choose between being killed by a terrorist for example or 
converting to Islam, I would favor death over life.” By the same token, Salwa pointed out 
that “I do not think that a Copt converted to Islam after the Islamists took power out of 
religious fears…however if this happened, let them enjoy…for myself, I never thought 
about changing my religion before or after the rise of Islamists to Egypt’s power.” 
 Regarding emigration, most of the participants either thought of leaving the 
country or applied already for emigration due to the wave of Islamization following the 
2011 revolution. For instance, Lydia said that “during Mursī’s tenure I was deeply 
depressed since my family and I were forced to think about emigration leaving everything 
here in Egypt…by the way, my family and I had already applied for emigration… 
personally speaking, I was torn at that time between staying and suffering more, or 
emigrating whenever our application would be accepted.” Although emigration did not 
have the potential to resolve historical collective grievances shared among Copts, it was 
deemed a plausible individual solution. Elaborating on this point, Peter explained that “in 
times where you find churches are burned down and several Coptic families are forced to 
leave their villages due to sectarian violence, one has nothing to do except thinking about 
emigration… and this what exactly happened to me…although I was aware that 
emigration would not resolve prolonged Coptic demands and grievances by any means, it 
was at least considered an appropriate option for individual Copts.” When asked about 
Copts who had already emigrated during the MB rule, Samya for instance stated that 
“Copts who got the chance and migrated during Mursī’s presidency are so 
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lucky…personally speaking I thought of leaving the country at the time since I had 
nothing to lose…for me, the matter was so clear… we Copts had no longer place in the 
country while the MB was in office…I wished I had the chance to emigrate like these 
lucky people who already emigrated.”   
 
Social change  
Contrary to social mobility, social change is a collective strategy through which members 
of a certain group tend to act collectively changing the entire social structure threatening 
interests of the whole group. The findings revealed that although both social mobility and 
social change were employed by ordinary Copts as means for survival during the MB era, 
the latter was considered a more effective means than the former. Social change was 
noticeably recognized in the June 30 protests where large numbers of Christians 
participated actively in the demonstrations, calling for eliminating what they perceived a 
real threat to the Coptic community as a whole (i.e., the MB rule). Mona, for instance, 
pointed out that “I think that resisting growing patterns of persecution we experienced 
during the MB era on the collective level was much better than embarking on individual 
solutions such as fleeing the country…I know that the former is risky and more difficult 
than the latter, but it is more effective in sustaining communal interests and social 
positions of Copts in general.” Agreeing, Heba stated that “I don’t blame those who 
already emigrated or thought about it…I myself kept begging my father to fill the 
emigration form…but since we had to stay I felt that the last resort for the Coptic 
community was to sign off the Tamaroud Movement’s petition and participate in the June 
30 events to get rid of the MB regime…in fact, I discovered later that the outcome 
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resulting from employing such communal behavior was much better than individual 
solutions.”  
It is worth mentioning here that the interviewees were aware that embarking on 
“street politics”, participating collectively in the protests calling for ousting Mursī’s 
regime, would ultimately invite the military to Egypt’s public affairs once again. To be 
sure, all of the interviewees indicated that they had supported the SCAF against Mursī’s 
regime regardless of the negative consequences of taking such position on the 
democratization process. Peter made this point clear stating that “we participated in the 
protests against the MB and we Copts were convinced at the time that these 
demonstrations would lead to the return of the SCAF to politics…straightforwardly, I 
prefer to be ruled by military than by Islamists…I know that military rule meant that 
everything would be put under the army’s control…and individuals’ basic freedoms 
would be undermined like what had been the case since the 1950s…however, the Islamist 
rule is much worse than the military’s ... how could someone dare to ask Christians to 
live and enjoy in an Islamic caliphate for example?! …how could we accept to be ruled 
by a group of people telling their opponents the following: ‘if you guys do not like us or 
do not accept our thoughts as they are you can leave the country and live abroad?”  For 
her turn, Mona explained why she supported the military’s intervention in politics during 
the MB rule arguing that “I definitely was so happy that the military decided to intervene 
in politics toppling Mursī’s government…this does not mean that I’m pro military rule all 
along…not at all, I’m just comparing between military rule and Islamist one… for me the 
former is better than the latter…at least the SCAF would not use religious claims while 
dealing with us like what Islamists have always done.” Adding another reason, Samy 
114 
 
indicated that “we Copts wanted to get rid of the MB regime even if the military would 
rule us again… as a matter of fact, the military would at least protect us from any 
external threats…in fact, I feel that the main goal of the Islamist rule has been to 
humiliate us using religious claims.” 
It is crucial before finishing this thesis to reemphasize the fact that sociopolitical 
and religious grievances of Copts have been present not only under the Islamists’ reign 
but also across Egypt’s consecutive regimes since the 1950s until the current incumbent. 
As Jason Brownlee has put it, “Copts remain one of Egyptian society’s most vulnerable 
communities.”235 This conclusion has been supported through the narratives provided by 
the interviewees. To give just a few examples, Peter indicated how his life has changed 
upside down due to his name which prevented him from achieving his dream to become a 
policeman. He elaborated that “we Copts have encountered all sorts of discrimination in 
this country regardless of the regime…may God forgive my father who had given me this 
name: Peter…I remember that black day during Mubarak’s regime when I stood in front 
of the committee choosing among nominee students to join the Police Academy…once I 
told them my name one of the committee members asked me ‘why did you come here 
Peter in the first place?’, referring to my Coptic identity…a few days later I was informed 
that my application was refused…believe me or not, I have started to hate my name since 
then.”  
Elaborating on the growing desires for emigration that have been adopted by 
Copts across different regimes, Yasser indicated that “I have been thinking about 
emigration since Mubarak’s regime until nowadays…I have filled several emigration 
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forms but the chance has not come yet…I have never felt I’m secured in this country 
regardless of names of presidents or their backgrounds.” For her turn, Mona highlighted 
these profound feelings of inferiority Copts have had to experience even under el-Sisi’s 
regime saying that, “a couple of months ago it happened that I was sitting in a bus and 
noticed that a man with a long beard kept starring at the Cross tattoo on my wrist and 
out of the blue he spat on my arm and went as if he did nothing…I was extremely shocked 
and did not dare to do anything except crying…although I was the one whose right was 
violated I was so scared whereas the offender was so relieved and went away 
confidently…these feelings of inferiority due to the fact that I’m just a Copt was so 
painful and unforgettable.” Bearing the previous examples in mind, feelings of religious 
insecurity shared among the Coptic community reached a peak during the Islamists’ reign 
as the results have revealed, however. 
In conclusion, this thesis has been about the roles played by  perceived identity 
threats in motivating collective action of Copts that was noticeably noticed in June 30 
protests. In addition, it has explored the mechanisms by which perceived threats were 
transformed into real action. Taking other relevant economic and political issues into 
account, this project has argued that religious threats were considered the main factor 
triggering Copts’ collective activism against Mursī’s regime. Utilizing the social identity 
theory and a complementary method constituting of both quantitative and qualitative 
indicators, findings of this work were in supportive of study’s main argument.  
This thesis contributes to literature on political transition in that it analyzes 
sociopolitical behavior of religious minorities (i.e., Copts) in times of change, 
emphasizing the influence of psycho-religious factors on inciting collective action among 
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marginalized religious groups. In the Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson argued 
that members of a certain group “will not [Italics in original] act to advance their 
common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or unless 
some separate incentive, distinct from the achievement of the common or group interest, 
is offered to the members of the group individually.”236 The results of this project have 
supported this logic. As for Olson’s first condition, it can be argued that ordinary Copts 
were “coerced” to act collectively against MB’s Islamist rule which was posing a 
fundamental threat either to the religious faith or the religious group to which they attach. 
Regarding the second constraint, it seemed that regaining the status quo that non-Islamist 
presidents have usually offered Copts was deemed the main “incentive” motivated 
individual Copts toward collective mobilization.  
  In order to understand why religion-inspired factors hold such as direct influence 
on people’s perceptions and behavior either those taken at the individual or group levels, 
it is crucial to recognize what distinguishes religious beliefs from other philosophies or 
dogmas. “The major characteristic of religious beliefs,” Clifford Geertz explains, “as 
opposed to other sorts of beliefs…is that they are regarded as being not conclusions from 
experience…but as being prior to it.”237 That is, “[t]hey are a light cast upon human life 
from somewhere outside it,”238 as the author furthered. In fact, the current work has 
provided empirical evidences supporting Olson’s and Geertz’s arguments, since the 
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results have emphasized the influential role religious affiliation played in shaping Copts’ 
communal behavior during the Muslim Brotherhood’s era.  
Although this thesis has achieved its primary goals, there were some unavoidable 
limitations and shortcomings. First, due to the lack of nationally representative surveys 
that have been conducted on Egypt’s Copt in particular, I had to rely on the AB datasets 
where the sample size of Copts in the two waves under study was small.
239
 Thus, the 
statistical procedures that have been performed using the Coptic samples only cannot be 
generalized. However, the results in which varying responses of Muslims and Copts are 
compared can be generalized. This is due to that percentages of Cops who participated in 
the two waves (5.8% and 5.7% in wave II and wave III, respectively) arguably represent 
their distributions in society. According to the latest official census conducted in 1986, 
Copts constitutes 6.2% of the Egyptian population.
240
  
Second, the qualitative analysis in this work is based on narratives collected only 
from Orthodox Copts (8 interviewees) and Protestants (3 interviewees).
241
 Other 
Christian denominations such as the Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic were not 
represented, however. Despite the fact that the Orthodox Coptic Church is deemed the 
                                                          
239
 Copts who participated in wave II (i.e., during SCAF’s transition) reached 71 
out of 1219 (5.8% of the whole sample). In wave III (i.e., during Mursī’s tenure), 69 of 
the1196 interviewees were Copts (5.7% of the entire sample).    
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 Mark Purcell, “A Place for the Copts: Imagined Territory and Spatial Conflict 
in Egypt,” Cultural Geographies 5, no. 4 (1998): 448. 
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 Bearing in mind the differences exist between the two religious denominations, 
Copts and Christians have been used interchangeably throughout this study.   
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oldest among other churches in Egypt
242
 and that Copts constitute the overwhelming 
majority of Egypt’s Christians,243 adherents of other Christian sects should have been 
involved. This would have enlarged the current study’s scope addressing all Christian 
denominations living in Egypt, which in turn would have enhanced the likelihood of 
study’s generalizability.   
Finally, this thesis suggests two main topics for further scrutiny in future research. 
First, this work has primarily addressed the causes and dynamics that incited collective 
mobilization among ordinary Copts during the MB rule. However, it is of crucial 
importance that upcoming studies examine corresponding causes and mechanisms 
leading to the formation of Coptic activists and Coptic social movements at that time. 
Relatedly, examining when and why these activists and/or social movements are either 
mobilized or radicalized would definitely add a lot to our understanding of the outcomes 
resulting from democratization and regime change. Second, the current work examined 
the association between perceived religious threats and collective action of Copts (i.e., 
participation in June 30 demonstrations) utilizing thematic analysis as a primary 
qualitative method, and other relevant quantitative indicators available.  
Nonetheless, future research can further elaborate the findings of this thesis by 
examining this relationship employing primary or secondary surveys that are exclusively 
designed to collect relevant data on the June 30 uprisings from Egypt’s Christian citizens 
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 Jill Kamil, Christianity in the Land of the Pharaohs: The Coptic Orthodox 
Church (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2002), 1. 
 
243
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only. This would generate more robust results on the associations and casual mechanisms 
proposed between religious identity and collective mobilization, i.e., between religion 
and politics in times of political transformation especially among religious minorities.  
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